Why (non-Irish) settled migrants don't deserve voting rights

Revoking the voting rights of Commonwealth citizens makes far more sense than giving them to literally everyone else

In a recently (re)published article, the academic Rob Ford calls for the enfranchisement of all long-term settled non-citizens, noting a number of inconsistencies in our current system. Such a move would purportedly resolve these inconsistencies. In particular, he draws attention to the fact that none of the millions of EU citizens resident in Britain can vote in Parliamentary elections, no matter how long they have been here, while certain other non-citizens can vote.

In this article, I will explain why, although Ford is correct to criticise our current arrangements, this is wholly the wrong approach. It does not seem to occur to Ford that some of these inconsistencies could potentially be ironed out via negative action, rather than positive — removing anomalous rights, rather than extending them to everyone. Instead, for Ford, rights, no matter how bizarre, must always operate as a ratchet; only increasing, never decreasing.

The current system

I will concede one, big point to Rob Ford: he is entirely correct to say that Britain’s current system of voting rights for non-citizens is inconsistent, and is perhaps also (as we shall see) nonsensical.

For those unacquainted with the (rather complex) rules on voter registration as they pertain to non-citizens, here is a summary:

• Irish citizens, ‘qualifying Commonwealth citizens’, and, under certain conditions, the citizens of EU countries, can register to vote in local elections — i.e., Police and Crime Commissioner, Elected Mayor, Council and Parish — in England and Northern Ireland. A ‘qualifying Commonwealth citizen’ is someone ‘who is resident in the UK and either [has] leave to remain in the UK or [does] not require such leave’. Under bilateral (post-Brexit) agreements, the citizens of Denmark, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, and Spain (all EU countries) can register to vote in local elections under similar conditions as ‘qualifying Commonwealth citizens’. The citizens of other EU countries can only register vote if, ‘on or before 31 December 2020 [they] were legally resident in the UK, had permission to enter or stay in the UK (or the Channel Islands or Isle of Man) and have remained resident without a break’.

• All legally resident foreign nationals, regardless of country of origin, can vote in local elections in Scotland and Wales, and can also in the Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru elections. (They still cannot vote in UK Parliamentary elections, even in Scottish and Welsh seats.)

• Irish nationals and ‘qualifying Commonwealth citizens’ can vote in Parliamentary elections. It is important to note that EU citizenship — including citizens of Denmark, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, or Spain — does not give you the right to vote in UK Parliamentary elections, and indeed never has.¹

So Commonwealth citizens and Irish citizens can vote in all elections. EU citizens can, in some circumstances, vote in English local elections. All non-citizens can vote in Scottish and Welsh local elections.

Please see Appendix (located at the end of this article) for more information on the development of British nationality and non-citizen voting rights in the twentieth century.

What are the problems with the current system?

The first, and most obvious, problem with the current system is that it lacks consistency in how it treats non-citizens. While unsatisfying, this is not such a disaster: in a country with a history that is as complex and globally interconnected as Britain, it is probably no surprise that we do not (and perhaps cannot) cleanly differentiate between all citizens and all non-citizens in an entirely consistent manner. Theoretical consistency is nice on paper, but is not always possible in practice. As Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister during the passage of the British Nationality Act 1948, which (among other things, see Appendix) confirmed the right of Irish nationals to vote in Britain, stated:

We… came to the conclusion that we should reciprocally decide that the people of Eire [i.e., Irish nationals] and the people of Britain should not be foreign to one another… I do not pretend that the solution at which we arrived is completely logical — very few things in the relationship between these islands have been completely logical — but I believe they are practical and I believe that they are to our mutual benefit.

Wise words indeed. Ford, by contrast, is attempting to remove all of these inconsistencies by demolishing the system entirely: something that is very much not ‘practical’, and is almost certainly not ‘to our mutual benefit’. This is something that seems rather out of character for Ford, typically some sort of ‘centrist dad’ type in his politics; an unusual radicalism, and willingness to blow things up to achieve ‘change’. Why?

The second, and in my view much more serious, problem is that the way in which it treats non-citizens is not only inconsistent, but is also illogical — or at the very least, extremely outdated. In short: the Britain of 2024 has not been closely tethered to the Commonwealth in practical terms for many, many decades, and will not be closely tethered to it for the foreseeable future. Retaining voting rights for ‘Commonwealth citizens’ in 2024 should be considered just as ridiculous as maintaining ‘imperial preference’ in 2024. It’s time for Britain to make its franchise fit for the modern world.

For those who need reminding, Britain was a European Union (previously EEC) member state from January 1973 until January 2020. During this time, Britain’s links to the Continent, economic and otherwise, were undoubtedly much closer than its links to the Commonwealth. Indeed, Britain joining the European Economic Community quite transparently, to both sides of the debate on Europe, represented a rejection of leaning so heavily on these Commonwealth links, and instead — logically enough — leaning upon those countries of much closer proximity to the British Isles.

Brexit, for some (i.e., a minority of its elite backers), meant attempting to restore a closer relationship with the Commonwealth, or at least ‘CANZUK’. Thus far, this has mostly only resulted in anything of substance whatsoever in the singular case of Australia. This move now seems to have stalled completely, with India apparently demanding that we give them virtually open borders (as if they weren’t open enough already) in exchange for a trade agreement — something that was (thankfully) blocked by Suella Braverman — and following the election of a Labour Government in 2024, which wants to reset its relationship with the European Union. As such, as of today, while (for better or for worse) we have rejected ‘ever closer union’ within the European Union, we have also done virtually nothing to rebuild our ties to the Commonwealth, and nor are there any firm plans to do so. The special provisions for ‘Commonwealth citizens’ thus are not only currently an anachronism, but will remain an anachronism for the foreseeable future.

Whilst the use of ‘free movement’ remained relatively low for the first three or so decades of EU membership, Britain received massive numbers of immigrants from the EU Accession countries (i.e., those countries that joined in either 2004 or 2007). Most EU migrants only stayed in Britain for a relatively short period of time — earning a bit of extra money, then going back home — and as such made little effort to integrate. However, for those who wanted to stay permanently, it seems undeniable that — regardless of our historical, imperial ties to the Commonwealth — they are, on average, culturally more similar to the Anglo-Celtic peoples than Commonwealth citizens, and are, on average, much better integrated than Commonwealth citizens, and are, on average, much less of a fiscal burden (or are even a fiscal boon) than Commonwealth citizens.²

It should go without saying that it is utterly absurd that a Bangladeshi Deliveroo driver — so long as he is a legal immigrant — can vote in Parliamentary elections almost immediately upon his arrival, yet a French woman living in Hertfordshire, married to an Englishman, with British children, who has lived here for twenty-five years, but who — for whatever reason — has failed to obtain British citizenship, cannot vote in either local elections or Parliamentary elections. It is very much understandable why many people are frustrated with the present situation — but that doesn’t mean that Ford’s proposals are the right answer to this.

What is Rob Ford proposing, and why?

Since Brexit, some unquantifiable proportion of the millions of EU citizens living in Britain cannot participate in any UK elections, local or Parliamentary. (Many others, however, can vote in local elections, on the terms set out in the first section.) Ford proposes that, in order to rectify this supposed iniquity, all long-term settled non-citizens should gain the ability to participate in all elections, both local and Parliamentary (and presumably also, if we ever suffer another, referendums). It should be noted that EU citizens couldn’t vote in Parliamentary elections while we were an EU member state, only local elections. This means that Ford wants to give more voting rights to EU citizens than they had even before Brexit!

Of course, those who meet the requirements (which is many of them) could acquire British citizenship if they wanted to vote in our Parliamentary elections, among other benefits. But, as Ford demonstrates, the uptake of citizenship among those born in EU countries, and in particular among Eastern and Southern Europeans, is low. Just 13% of Italians; 13% of Spanish; 10% of Poles; 8% of Romanians; 5% of Portuguese; and 4% of Lithuanians had acquired British citizenship by 2021. (Although not listed, I imagine the figures for Bulgarians are similar to those of the rest of Eastern Europe.) These figures have been increasing since Brexit took effect in 2020, but still lag behind those of many other nationalities.

As a result, Rob Ford proposes that Britain unilaterally grants voting rights to all settled foreign nationals. Yes, that’s right: we won’t get to vote in France, or in the United States, but they will get to vote here!

Perhaps the most strange element to Ford’s argument — in fact, the element that underpins most of it — is his claim that there is something prohibitive about obtaining British citizenship. Ford claims in the comments that

…Britain has some of the most restrictive and expensive citizenship rules in the world (much more so than France) — opening the political system to settled migrant by liberalising that system would be fine by me also.

It is extraordinary that such an experienced political commentator could make a comment (‘…some of the most restrictive…’) so utterly detached from reality.

In fact, this is not only untrue, but is the opposite of the truth: as regular Pimlico Journal contributor Thdhmo has pointed out in an excellent article for J’accuse, British citizenship is an international outlier in how easy it is to obtain. The real stinker, from the perspective of someone who doesn’t want to hand out British citizenship like candy, is Indefinite Leave to Remain — in most cases, so long as you spend five years here (and in some cases, as few as two or three) working on the right visa (with up to a massive 450 days out of the country in that time permitted), it is yours! And, once Indefinite Leave to Remain is acquired, the path to citizenship is very simple indeed. Just wait out your time (as little as twelve months!), memorise the answers to the citizenship test, gather the requisite paperwork, pay the fee, and you’re done! English proficiency isn’t required, just enough for ‘independent use’. In fact, even if you receive a custodial sentence, all that happens is that the timer is reset, so long as the sentence was for less than twelve months.

As it happens, I know a number of European ‘yuppies’ working towards British citizenship right now, most of whom did not live here prior to adulthood. That they can even think about obtaining it at such a young age tells us that it isn’t hard to get at all: it’s just annoying, in terms of work (you have to remember loads of useless facts for the citizenship test, like how many people are on a Scottish jury); in terms of paperwork (proving you have been here long enough, and haven’t been out of the country for too long); and — as Ford points out — because it’s quite expensive.

It is only on this final point that Ford’s claims have any basis whatsoever. As it happens, I do agree with Ford is that the current method used to ration British citizenship, namely the ludicrous fees the Home Office demands, is inappropriate. But it is only in this sole respect that acquiring British citizenship is challenging. In theory, it should mean that only those who are doing well enough financially to afford the fees will apply. But in practice, the people you least want to obtain citizenship will pool together funds to pay for it; meanwhile, the people you don’t mind getting citizenship might well decide they can’t be bothered. It also gives the appearance of selling citizenships, which makes a mockery of the entire system.

However, these barriers — while they have manifestly failed to ration citizenship in practice — should not be removed until the other barriers, especially the barriers to obtaining Indefinite Leave to Remain, and to converting Indefinite Leave to Remain to British citizenship, are tightened. Certainly, I cannot agree with Ford’s view that

…access to citizenship itself could be made easier. For example, the millions of long term resident migrants who have already been granted settled status by the British government could be offered a lower cost, faster track [how much faster could it even be!] to British citizenship. This would overnight enable millions to more easily join the political process — but without obliging any to do so.

For Ford, we should note, there is a personal aspect to this element of his proposals. In a footnote, he writes:

I should declare an interest: My mum was one such EU citizen. She arrived in 1976, and despite a keen interest in politics was unable to make her voice heard in any general election from then until her death in 2022, as — like the majority of her 86,000 fellow Dutch nationals — she opted not to take British citizenship.

It is interesting that even here, Ford chooses the words ‘opted not to take British citizenship’. He does not claim that she could not acquire British citizenship; merely that she chose not to acquire it. Why?

It surprises me that this even needs to be said, but if you want to participate in British Parliamentary elections, you should feel yourself to be British. And, if you feel yourself to be British, you should seek to acquire British citizenship.

It would be one thing if Britain imposed totally unreasonable barriers to acquiring citizenship, but as we have shown, this is not the case, even taking into account the (admittedly inappropriate) financial costs imposed by the Home Office. If you really do care, that should be a small price, in a literal sense, to pay to participate in our democracy. And given that Britain, unlike many other countries — which choose to take the historical ideas behind the concept of ‘citizenship’ to its logical conclusion — permits dual nationality, there is even less of an excuse for not acquiring it.³

The only other serious non-political argument that Ford deploys in his favour, other than the anomalies caused by the rules for Commonwealth citizens and Irish nationals, is that a few surveys supposedly show support for such a move. It is highly questionable whether surveys on such niche questions, that few people answering have ever thought much about, are of any real significance. That Keir Starmer himself renounced his previous support for enfranchising EU nationals suggests that politicians, who are (for all their faults) more tuned in to the electorate, are rather sceptical — to say the least — that doing this is such a winning issue, as Ford claims. I suspect if this issue was publicly litigated, the majority would come to a similar conclusion as myself: that the voting rights of Commonwealth citizens make no sense, not that these rights should be extended to everyone.

In brief, then, the error that Ford makes is (correctly) noting the two major anomalies in the system — namely, the fact that Commonwealth citizens and Irish nationals can vote in Parliamentary elections, but that most other nationals cannot even participate in local elections — but, instead of resolving these anomalies (which do admittedly produce absurdities) in a sensible way, he decides the ‘solution’ to this ‘problem’ is to virtually abolish the concept of ‘British citizenship’ in its entirety. And, in the process of virtually abolishing the concept of ‘British citizenship’ in its entirety, he somehow pretends that what he is proposing is highly moderate, rather than deeply subversive.

What would the impact of Rob Ford’s proposed changes to the franchise be?

What would the immediate electoral impact of enfranchising all settled non-citizens be? Most likely, not much.

As Ford demonstrates in his article, of the top twenty biggest groups of settled migrants, nine (Commonwealth countries plus the Republic of Ireland) can vote immediately upon arrival. Of the eleven remaining, eight are EU member states. The three left unaccounted for are the United States, China, and the Philippines: 42% of those born in America have British citizenship; 60% of those born in China; and 66% of those born in the Philippines.

This means that by far the biggest impact of this change will be the extension of voting rights to EU citizens — in particular, to Eastern and Southern Europeans.

Personally, I think that only a small number of those EU citizens who did not bother (and I use the word ‘bother’ deliberately, for the reasons outlined above) to obtain British citizenship would vote in Parliamentary elections. I suspect that participation rates among Commonwealth citizens are very low already, and I see little reason to believe why participation rates among EU citizens would be much higher.

However, insofar as people from these newly enfranchised groups did participate, it would probably be — very marginally — beneficial for the political Right. The voting figures for the Romanian diaspora in Britain at the recent Presidential and Parliamentary elections says it all: around half of them voted for the far-right, ‘sovereigntist’ candidate, Calin Georgescu, and a large proportion of the remainder voted for the pro-European and socially liberal, but distinctly anti-tax, candidate Elena Lasconi.⁴

While Romanians are probably a particularly extreme case — most other groups, except maybe Bulgarians, are probably more a bit left-wing — this most likely stands more generally. It is, however, also quite likely that the small number of these foreign nationals who did bother to participate in Parliamentary elections would skew more to the Left than the rest of the diaspora.⁵ Many of the more right-wing and nationalistic members of these European diasporas would probably consider it inappropriate to participate in UK Parliamentary elections, even if they had the theoretical right to do so.

Taking all of the above into account, my conclusion is as follows. I seriously doubt this claim Ford makes in his article:

…one consequence [of the disenfranchisement of many non-citizens] has been to skew the migration debate — millions of settled migrants, in particular EU migrants, have no votes, but those who dislike their presence do have votes, and have used these effectively to mobilise opposition to immigration in the EU referendum and in the general elections since.

Any Englishman who visits a country like Romania or Bulgaria will be told in no uncertain terms by their people (including those who have lived in Britain), sometimes even completely unprompted, that Britain lets in far too many migrants from the Third World. Ford is living in a fantasy land if he thinks this will tilt the present-day immigration debate — as opposed to the debate on the European Union, which is already finished, at least as a live political issue — in his side’s favour. He should get out and speak to more people, and not just the completely unrepresentative activists at organisations like ‘the3million’.

So, on balance, the electoral effects of such a change would most likely be very small, and potentially even very slightly beneficial to the British Right. But to focus excessively on the immediate electoral effect — which is minimal — of enfranchising those currently disenfranchised non-citizens, mostly Eastern and Southern Europeans, would be a serious mistake.

The main change in practice — and this, in my view, is in fact Ford’s main goal here — is the complete destruction of British citizenship as a concept. These non-citizen rights would not merely apply to people from countries with some kind of historic connection with Britain — Ireland, the Commonwealth, and now the EU — but to anyone who has lived here long enough, no questions asked. Not only would the French and Americans be enfranchised, but the Laotians and Congolese too. And what even remains of ‘British citizenship’ once you can even participate in our national elections without it? You can already live and work here indefinitely without it. You can already claim state benefits without it. Consular assistance abroad? Working for the diplomatic service? There really isn’t much left, at least as it pertains to life in Britain itself. And from here, we can see some other consequences. Since there is no difference in practice between non-citizens and citizens, on what logical basis could we remove non-citizen criminals or deny non-citizens access to welfare? Or, more radically, on what basis could we even have a border at all?

Finally, another likely — this time indirect — effect of permitting all settled non-citizens to vote in Parliamentary elections would be to increase number of Commonwealth nationals actually exercising their legal right to vote. The existence of this right is, as we have already explained, totally absurd in 2024; fortunately, I suspect that rather few Commonwealth citizens are even aware that they can vote, and even fewer actually do so. Making the currently somewhat arcane rules on eligibility far simpler and far more transparent is very undesirable for this reason: we don’t want more of these people to participate in our elections, because they shouldn’t have the right to participate in the first place!

What is to be done?

So if Ford’s proposals are a non-starter, despite the very real problems with the current system, what should we do instead? In my view, the answer is the following: Britain needs to decolonise itself. It needs to become a normal nation-state, not pretend that it is somehow still the metropole of a global empire; to become a country with normal citizenship laws and normal rules on who can vote, not pretend that it still ‘rules the waves’.

The first step is to resist any further extensions of voting rights to non-citizens. Most obviously, we must reject Ford’s call to extend voting rights for Parliamentary elections beyond Irish nationals and ‘qualifying Commonwealth citizens’, and to all settled non-citizens. But we should go further than this: no more bilateral treaties with other EU countries (or indeed, anywhere else) on rights to vote in local elections, let alone Parliamentary elections, should be negotiated, even in cases where they are reciprocal. Furthermore, existing rights to vote for the nationals of Denmark, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, and Spain should not be extended to Parliamentary elections. This is not an insult against any of these countries — all of which I have respect for — or their citizens. It is a simple recognition of the fact that British citizenship means something. Adding yet more exemptions and exceptions gives people who want to upend the current system entirely, often for nefarious reasons, yet more excuses to do so.

The second, more radical, step is to remove the voting rights of Commonwealth nationals, resolving the worst anomaly in the current system at the stroke of a pen. The priority should be removing these rights from Parliamentary elections; the question of local elections (which matter far less, and in which the participation of non-citizens is easier to defend on a theoretical basis) is a separate matter. While these voting rights might have made sense in 1954, they no longer make sense in 2024: they are a blatant anachronism. As this is an important change to the rules of our electoral system, this should be achieved through transparent, democratic means — not underhandedly, as many proponents of changes in the opposite direction wish to do. Ideally, it should be a clear manifesto commitment, implemented after a Party (or two Parties in coalition, with the same commitment) obtains a majority at a General Election. If this is still too radical, a compromise — in my view, too weak — could be that voting rights are given only to Commonwealth nationals who arrived before a certain date (such as the date of the enactment of a new Act), or only to those born prior to the full independence of the relevant country from Britain.

In the end, the only foreign nationals who should have the right to vote in Parliamentary elections in Britain are Irish nationals.⁶ While some Pimlico Journal readers may disagree with even this, I think there are a number of good reasons for maintaining a special provision for Irish nationals, even if this is theoretically unsatisfying for purists.

The first is the fact that these rights are (almost) fully reciprocal: few British nationals are aware of this, but they can still, in fact, vote in Irish Parliamentary elections under the same conditions as Irish nationals can vote in UK Parliamentary elections.

The second is that, due to our history, which is far more totally and deeply intertwined with Ireland (and, concomitantly, Ireland with Britain) than with any other country, it is almost inevitable that our relations with the Republic of Ireland will be somewhat ‘special’, as Clement Attlee alluded to. This is our real ‘special relationship’, in a sense, though obviously with a rather different meaning to that of our supposed ‘special relationship’ with the United States. Many people have observed that the British Nationality Act 1948 is virtually unique across the world in how it treats a certain other country’s nationals. This was for good reason.

The idea that our relationship with ‘the Commonwealth’, i.e., the rest of the former British Empire — let alone our relationship with EU member states —can be compared to our relationship with the Republic of Ireland is so absurd that it should be able to be dismissed out of hand; mere sophistry. Our semi-colonial relationship with Ireland predates that of the rest of our global empire by centuries, and lasted longer than anywhere else. It is the only part of the Empire that saw large amounts of settlement both ways, most importantly for our present purposes in the form of lots of Irish internal migration to England and Scotland in the nineteenth century and earlier twentieth century. It was also, critically, treated rather differently: as an intrinsic part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It is one element of the highly complex, and at times fragile, settlement in the break-up of two deeply intertwined nations. There is, in short, every reason in the world to give special treatment to Irish nationals, and to no-one else.

Finally, although seemingly a minor point, there is in fact a double absurdity in the current rules on the voting rights of Commonwealth citizens: the last four countries to join the Commonwealth — Mozambique, Rwanda, Gabon, and Togo — have no historic links to the British Empire. And yet, the nationals of these countries are given exactly the same voting rights as the nationals of countries that actually were in the British Empire. What is even the justification for this? Stroking the egos of the Windsors? So far as I can tell, there is none. This brings us neatly to our conclusion: what is the justification for the existence of the Commonwealth itself in 2024? What do we gain from it? The answer to the first question also seems to be, ‘there is none’, and to the second, ‘nothing but grief’. But that is a topic for another day…

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Appendix: Non-citizen voting rights and the development of ‘British nationality’ in the twentieth century

The right of Irish nationals to vote in UK elections, including Parliamentary elections, was de facto in place — albeit with considerable ambiguity — from Irish independence in 1922, but was confirmed de jure in the British Nationality Act 1948, which stated that, while resident in Commonwealth countries, Irish nationals would be considered British subjects despite Ireland’s decision to neither join the Commonwealth nor retain the monarch as head of state, thus giving them the right to vote in Britain. The special status of Irish citizens was reconfirmed in the Ireland Act 1949, and again in the British Nationality Act 1981. All three Acts expressly excluded Irish citizens from being considered ‘aliens’. As such, Irish voting rights were unaffected by Brexit.

The situation of ‘qualifying Commonwealth citizens’ is somewhat more complex. In the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, all people living in the Empire were officially deemed by statute to be ‘British subjects’ (though a somewhat similar system had been in operation for some time before then). This, logically, gave them the right to vote (under the same terms as anyone else) in elections here. Then, in the British Nationality Act 1948, provisions were made so that ‘British subjects’, meaning someone who owed allegiance to the king or queen, were effectively equivalent to ‘Commonwealth citizens’, including those (e.g., Indian nationals) who did not owe allegiance to the king or queen (i.e., they were not actually, in reality as opposed to in law, ‘British subjects’). This meant that these citizens of countries that were both republics and Commonwealth member states could, like bona fide British subjects, vote in our elections.

Finally, in almost all circumstances, ‘British subject’ ceased to have any meaning as a status following the passage of the British Nationality Act 1981; it was no longer virtually synonymous with ‘Commonwealth citizen’. However, assurances were given that this would not affect the franchise. This was confirmed in the Representation of the People Act 1983, which stated that ‘Commonwealth citizens’ were still included in the franchise.

These voting rights for non-citizens are reciprocal in the cases of the Republic of Ireland (for all elections except Presidential elections and referendums), and of Denmark, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, and Spain (for local elections). So far as I can tell, there is no reciprocity for Commonwealth countries, nor for the other EU countries, and if there is (still) any reciprocity, it is purely the decision of the Commonwealth or EU country itself. In the past, some Commonwealth member states (namely, the ‘Dominions’) had a certain degree of reciprocity; however, this was mostly phased out in the ’70s and ’80s. While reciprocity is not legally required in the Irish case either, it seems unlikely that it will be reversed in the foreseeable future, as it is an aspect of the complex settlement between the two, deeply intertwined, sovereign states.

1. This means that the nationals of three EU member states have the right to vote in Parliamentary elections: Malta and Cyprus, as Commonwealth members; and Ireland, as a consequence of the British Nationality Act 1948.

2. With a heavy emphasis upon ‘on average’. Obviously, fiscal contributions will vary a lot depending on which country we are talking about (for example, Australians and Singaporeans are almost certainly very fiscally positive for the country).

It could be argued that citizens of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, perhaps the United States (not a Commonwealth member state), and perhaps also South Africans of English (not Afrikaner or African) heritage are more similar to the ‘Anglo-Celtic peoples’ than EU nationals. But to avoid needless complexity, let us leave aside this point for now.

3. This is beyond the scope of this article, but there is a very strong case against permitting dual nationality, with an appropriate exception for British-Irish dual nationals (for the same reason that Irish nationals have a special status in other respects). It has already created trouble for us in the past: for instance, having to ‘intervene’ on behalf of random political activists abroad. There are, it must be remembered, many people who have no real link to Britain in practice, have retained a second (or even a third) citizenship elsewhere, live elsewhere, participate in politics (or other activities) elsewhere, but who — using the fact that they are, on paper, British citizens — expect us to try to bail them out if they get in trouble with the authorities.

On balance, I do not think it is worth the trouble of banning dual nationality, as it would be highly impractical in the modern world. But I certainly do have some theoretical sympathies with those who do support it.

There are also some difficulties caused by countries where it is de jure impossible (e.g., Argentina) or de facto impossible (e.g., Iran) to renounce one’s citizenship. In theory, this makes it impossible for these people to acquire British citizenship under any circumstances, which is not desirable.

4. Of course, this is partly because Romania has only one genuinely centrist party, REPER, and only one genuinely left-wing party, SENS. And some Romanians voted tactically for Lasconi despite being ‘left-wing’, due to these two parties being of very little significance — but the general point still stands.

5. Consider the absurdity that Alexandra Bulat, a Romanian-British dual national, and professional pro-migration activist, almost became the very first Romanian-British MP in 2024 — absurd, because her views are obviously completely out of step with the vast majority of her demonstrably very much right-leaning compatriots. Most likely, right-leaning Romanians are less likely to acquire British citizenship in the first place, and those who do acquire it are also less likely to participate in a foreign country’s elections.

6. There are, potentially, some theoretical circumstances where these rights could be revoked, but this would most likely follow a total breakdown in relations between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Obviously, this is extremely undesirable and all efforts should be made to avoid this outcome.