Yeah, Wittgestein made a serious point against analytic philosophy and showed that language needs to be understood in context. In particular, reductive definitions proceed by de-contextualising language leading to philosophical pseudo-problems. Pragmatism has actually moved in that direction before Wittgenstein and probably more effectively. Thus, pragmatism can help to explain why the modern society's idea that women can be 'equal' to men merely leads to women becoming more like men. So eg., E Michael Jones pointed out that the problem with having men in women's boxing is not merely that men are strong, but that women shouldn't be boxing, or generally doing these sorts of sports, because it turns women into men, eg., bc women who train for these sorts of sports lose their period. Thus, pragmatist thinking allows us for a broader and non-reductive notion of what a 'woman' and a 'man' is.
I'm not sure I follow - if we accept the claim "how does "boxing turns women into men", or the easier-to-defend version "boxing leads to women becoming more like men", how does that imply "women shouldn't boxing"?.
If someone told you "reading makes you less like a human, and more like an enlightened Ubermensch", would you conclude that because you're a human, you ought not to read?
I would also add that the concept of hyperintensionality also has interesting implications with respect to identity.
Basically, two necessarily equivalent (if and only if, in all cases) expressions can differ in truth-value. My favorite example is the difference between an equilateral triangle and an equi-angular triangle -- necessarily equivalent/imply each other, yet different cognitive meaning. Or, consider 'water is H2O'. So, there are plausibly aspects of meaning that have nothing to do with the determination of truth, and/or there are cognitive shadings that simply cannot be captured representationally.
Extending this to identity, the sense in which we simply identify (by pointing or saying) a genetically white person as 'white' is different than the sense in which this person is white by virtue of their having a particular genetic profile.
Yeah, Wittgestein made a serious point against analytic philosophy and showed that language needs to be understood in context. In particular, reductive definitions proceed by de-contextualising language leading to philosophical pseudo-problems. Pragmatism has actually moved in that direction before Wittgenstein and probably more effectively. Thus, pragmatism can help to explain why the modern society's idea that women can be 'equal' to men merely leads to women becoming more like men. So eg., E Michael Jones pointed out that the problem with having men in women's boxing is not merely that men are strong, but that women shouldn't be boxing, or generally doing these sorts of sports, because it turns women into men, eg., bc women who train for these sorts of sports lose their period. Thus, pragmatist thinking allows us for a broader and non-reductive notion of what a 'woman' and a 'man' is.
I'm not sure I follow - if we accept the claim "how does "boxing turns women into men", or the easier-to-defend version "boxing leads to women becoming more like men", how does that imply "women shouldn't boxing"?.
If someone told you "reading makes you less like a human, and more like an enlightened Ubermensch", would you conclude that because you're a human, you ought not to read?
Excellent essay. I agree with this approach.
I would also add that the concept of hyperintensionality also has interesting implications with respect to identity.
Basically, two necessarily equivalent (if and only if, in all cases) expressions can differ in truth-value. My favorite example is the difference between an equilateral triangle and an equi-angular triangle -- necessarily equivalent/imply each other, yet different cognitive meaning. Or, consider 'water is H2O'. So, there are plausibly aspects of meaning that have nothing to do with the determination of truth, and/or there are cognitive shadings that simply cannot be captured representationally.
Extending this to identity, the sense in which we simply identify (by pointing or saying) a genetically white person as 'white' is different than the sense in which this person is white by virtue of their having a particular genetic profile.
Because we want to reproduce.
Why? I thought it was quite interesting and insightful.