The US National Security Strategy: a European perspective
European independence as the basis for a New Atlanticism
It was Henry Kissinger who remarked, in a 2018 interview with the Financial Times, that ‘…Trump may be one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretences.’ Last week, the White House published its latest National Security Strategy (NSS) outlining the principles and priorities of U.S. foreign policy under his administration. More than any previous text, it stands as the most coherent articulation of America First, and, in doing so, emphatically vindicates Kissinger’s prediction.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the strategy has elicited a screeching response from the foreign affairs establishment. More alarming than the outrage has been the apparent disinterest, beyond hysterical condemnation, in the document from our own politicians and commentariat. Thus, once again, it falls to Pimlico Journal to illuminate what the NSS means for Britain, for Europe, and the future of our relations with the United States.
At only 33 pages, I would recommend reading the entirety of the NSS for yourself. Its content, combined with an understanding of the chaotic and experimental nature of the Trump administration, provides a strong basis to understand the motivations behind American diplomacy, which can often appear inconsistent but should not be understood as ‘random’.
The document has two broad themes which run throughout. The first is a statement of principles and worldview; the complete rejection of universalism, which has been the core driver of American foreign policy for almost a century. The second is a definition of ends; retrenching international commitments based on a constrained definition of core national interests. We will explore both separately.
Dubbed ‘Flexible Realism’, the NSS lays out a perspective on international relations which represents a substantial break from past administrations. It makes clear in no uncertain terms that nations have particular traditions and histories; that development is not a linear path with ‘liberal democracy’ as a natural end point; that this is a fact which cannot be altered; and that it would not be desirable for the United States to attempt to enforce any particular mode of government on a foreign country even if it were possible at least temporarily.
Through this lens, everything from intervention in Afghanistan to the facilitation of China’s economic growth is cast as a naïve and costly mistake, expending American lives, power, and wealth on the basis of false universalist assumptions. This understanding is extended not just to states as political units but to the peoples that make them up. It conceives, then, of European Civilisation as the project of the European people and their global descendants, and insists that other peoples cannot be assumed to desire the same ends simply as a result of economic growth and social advancement.
It therefore rejects the notion that the future is necessarily one of peace and co-operation between all nations, and asserts the requirement for American strength in the face of rising powers with necessarily misaligned objectives — notably China. It does not seek to influence the development of other peoples in order to align them with American goals: such an effort would be folly under its own assumptions regarding the differences between peoples. Instead, it seeks to maintain America’s position to contain the influence of competitors on the global stage and secure those interests viewed as ‘core’ to the perpetuation of US economic and military dominance.
The document is certainly nationalist, rather than ‘civilisationist’. It understands the United States as a nation with its own particular interests which should be advanced, rather than advancing the interests of European civilisation as a whole. Nevertheless, it views European nations as deep partners with a fundamentally shared set of objectives despite the possibility for internal conflicts of interest within that partnership. Its agnosticism on the internal affairs of other countries therefore does not extend to Europe, where it views the maintenance of the basis of this partnership as a key strategic priority.
It is within this context that the NSS has generated the most controversy. As well as reaffirming a commitment to uphold supposedly shared political commitments such as freedom of speech and encouraging European leaders towards greater civilisational confidence in the face of declining economic and military power, it explicitly recognises the basis of US-European relations in their shared ethnic heritage:
‘Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.’
It is worth commenting that a European may be well placed to have precisely the same fears regarding the United States’ own demographic future, given that they are further down this path than any European country and that a reversal of these trends seems more implausible there than here.
Nevertheless, the statement in its own terms is evidently correct, despite the protests of much of the European commentariat. In the 2024 UK General Election, five MPs (the ‘Gaza Independents’) from a South Asian Muslim background were elected on an explicitly sectarian platform. These MPs, whilst broadly perceived as being on the left, cannot in reality be conceptualised as being in any way related to traditional British political divides, as has become clear following the collapse of efforts to incorporate this group into Jeremy Corbyn’s new hard left party. They advocate for the views and interests of their ethnic group. It is fitting, then, that their primary issue is Gaza — a foreign policy question with no bearing whatsoever on life in Britain. Nor is it just Britain: in France, we have Jean-Luc Melenchon’s La France Insoumise, with 72 seats in the National Assembly, fusing extreme-left, ethnosectarian, and Islamic politics; in the Netherlands, the social-democratic Denk won 3 seats as a party explicitly catering to the interests of immigrants and Muslims. Sooner or later, other European countries with large immigrant populations seem likely to go down the same path.
The election of this group has had impact on our broader politics, and in particular on our foreign allegiances. It has undoubtedly pressured Labour to adopt a tougher stance on Israel than it might have done otherwise. Similarly, the Conservatives have sought to cultivate the ‘Hindu vote’ by, among other things, subtly aligning UK foreign policy with India on issues such as Kashmir. In 2024, the Tories gained only one seat — the highly multicultural Leicester East, where their candidate was the former Miss India UK contestant Shivani Raja. The contest saw parts of Leicester explode into ethnic violence between Indian and Pakistani residents, and votes fell entirely along sectarian lines.
Regardless of the position one might take on any of these foreign policy questions, it is clear that there is something deeply wrong when Britain’s stance is determined not by national interest or even the sentiments of the British people, but by the need to electorally court foreign ethnic voting blocs. In fact, it is an openly expressed intention of the Indian government in particular to ensure that its diaspora can be leveraged to provide political support abroad — a strategy to which Britain is uniquely vulnerable given our unilateral concession of voting rights to all ‘Commonwealth citizens’. With this in mind, it is inconceivable that demographic change could not alter our orientation towards NATO, the United States, or any other question of international allegiance.
It is for this reason that the NSS elevates immigration to the status of a critical national security challenge. It declares that ‘the era of mass migration is over’, informing Europeans that:
‘We want full control over our borders, over our immigration system, and over transportation networks through which people come into our country—legally and illegally. We want a world in which migration is not merely “orderly” but one in which sovereign countries work together to stop rather than facilitate destabilizing population flows, and have full control over whom they do and do not admit.’
This is an area where, so far at least, the actions of the administration are yet to catch up with their rhetoric — no action has yet been taken on legal immigration and the deportation program is woefully insufficient. It remains to be seen whether 2026 will be more promising in this regard — although it would be unwise to hold too much hope.
It is important, though, not to interpret this desire to see Europe remain European as motivated solely by realpolitik concerns for the Continent’s alignment with the US on the global stage. Despite the fundamentally national goals elucidated in the NSS, there is a genuine sense that transatlantic relations are and should remain rooted in a shared cultural and ethnic heritage which aligns mutual interests in a way which is not purely mercenary.
This is crucial in the face of what has been a ham-fisted and poorly-calculated series of attacks on Europe and its political establishment by American officials, most notably JD Vance in his well-publicised Munich Security Conference speech. What has been interpreted as a fundamental antipathy towards Europe on this side of the Atlantic is described in the NSS as a desire to see Europe take on its own responsibilities for defence as independent partners, and for current leaders to be replaced by those with political sympathies towards the Trump administration.
As Europeans, we cannot simply take this presentation for granted. We must be prepared for a future in which America is fundamentally hostile, or at least indifferent towards, Europe — not least because of their own demographic issues. Nevertheless, the demands made of Europe in the NSS are in fact the policies that we should be following regardless of US policy. Europe must become capable of maintaining its own defence, and cease reliance on American muscle. We should be able to manage our relationship with Russia, whether it is one of outright confrontation or rapprochement from a position of strength, without requiring extensive American support. We must address our demographic issues and prevent our own replacement.
Given this, we should remain open to the possibility that, having achieved these goals, friendly relations with America can still pertain. It is, after all, entirely legitimate for the US to recognise its own national interests and to pursue them as even countries within the EU do internally — provided that there is at least some degree of altruism between parties. That prospect is not precluded by the vision laid out in the NSS.
It is necessary to lay out a theoretical understanding of international relations in order to describe a national security strategy, but the core purpose of such a document to define a nation’s goals and the means by which it intends to achieve them. The second theme of the NSS does precisely that. It offers a broad critique of US overextension, and proposes a retrenchment of American international commitments:
‘American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.’
‘Since at least the end of the Cold War, administrations have often published National Security Strategies that seek to expand the definition of America’s “national interest” such that that almost no issue or endeavour is considered outside its scope. But to focus on everything is to focus on nothing. America’s core national security interests shall be our focus.’
In this light, the NSS identifies the Western Hemisphere as the central focus of American interests. It reasserts the Monroe Doctrine — that no non-Hemispheric competitor shall position forces or threatening capabilities in the Americas — with the addition of the ‘Trump Corollary’, which expands this exclusionary policy to include ownership or control of strategically vital assets in the region.
It defines American goals in the region as the enlisting of friendly states to collaborate on issues of migration and drug trafficking whilst participating in the reshoring of supply chains and the development of Hemispheric markets for export and investment, as well as seeking to build new relationships with historically or currently hostile states. Whilst there is no specific commitment to action made, it is clear that this will involve supporting sympathetic parties in democratic countries (such as Brazil) and, whilst perhaps stopping short of military intervention, seeking to ensure the overthrow of hostile dictatorships (most notably in Venezuela). The document outlines American strategy to achieve this strengthening of its hemispheric position, which involves a readjustment of global military presence to increase capabilities closer to home. This has already been seen with the recent redeployment of naval assets in the Caribbean as tensions with Venezuela continue to rise.
A focus on the home region, however, is not intended to imply a total retreat from concerns elsewhere. The NSS makes clear that ensuring stability in Europe and keeping hostile influence out of the Middle East (and therefore keeping enemies dependent on energy supply chains they do not control) both remain key priorities. Likewise, the strategy commits the United States to an expanded presence in the Pacific in order to contain China and maintain key supply chains.
Delivery on this front requires a reduction in American presence in the old world — seemingly in contradiction with the continued desire for influence in Europe and the Middle East. This circle is squared with the concept of burden-shifting, wherein a newly strengthened Europe will take responsibility both for its own security and Western interests in its near abroad. This shift in expectations will have major consequences for Europe and for Britain. It has been a bipartisan position to ask America’s allies to do more on defence spending for some time, but the NSS transforms Trumps pre-existing agenda into something far more aggressive.
Following the publication of the NSS, Pentagon officials informed European counterparts that they had until 2027 to take over the majority of NATO’s conventional defence capabilities. This covers a wide range of capacities, from missile facilities to espionage. Dissatisfied with the pace of European militarisation, Washington suggested that it may pull out of some NATO defence coordination mechanisms if this deadline is not met, or if European allies fail to lift defence spending to 5% of GDP in line with June’s Hague Commitment. If enforced, this would leave Europe significantly less secure — but in an increasingly tight fiscal environment, it is not clear how we can meet these targets without politically impossible cuts or severe budgetary shocks.
European officials are, of course, unlikely to receive this well or to make substantial course corrections in the near future. They continue to hope that Trump and his politics are an aberration, and that normalcy will be resumed in 2028. That expectation is incorrect and highly dangerous for Europe and its security. Much as the Biden administration continued much of Trump 1’s work against China, a future Democratic administration is overwhelmingly unlikely to roll back demands for greater European defence contributions or to recommit American resources to the European theatre. This dynamic will only intensify as the diversification of the Democratic party dissolves any lingering sense of particular connection to the continent that party leaders have had even in the recent past.
This sense of unfairness was made more acute by the document’s lack of focus on Russia. It must be noted, however, that there is very little further to be said on the issue, especially from an American perspective. Ukraine, whilst fighting valiantly, is losing the war inch by inch. Russian manpower and materiel is proving more resilient than those of their opponents. In all likelihood, the best deal for Ukraine would have been achieved long in the past, and prospects are only likely to further decline. The NSS recognises implicitly the frustrating reality that America has very little leverage remaining over Putin and the Russian state. They have already deployed sanctions unprecedentedly broadly, and Russia now stands isolated as a pariah among developed nations.
As Flexible Realism implies, there is no point moralising with a state that does not share your values and whose interests are fundamentally contrary to your own. There is, in fact, only one way to ‘re-establish conditions of strategic stability’ in Europe without American investment which will, quite reasonably, not be forthcoming: a stronger, more assertive Europe. It is for this reason that the NSS focuses on chastising Europe, rather than attacking Russia. Building on Vice President Vance’s Munich speech, the NSS laments European elites for their lack of self-confidence, insufficient defence spending, porous borders and stifling regulatory environment.
We are increasingly accustomed to this routine in Britain, where almost every week the American Ambassador chastises Energy Secretary Ed Miliband as he zealously implements his Net Zero agenda; impoverishing voters and destroying any remaining heavy industry. Unsatisfied with lambasting Europe’s material struggle, the NSS even elevates its prose to an existential level, warning against ‘civilizational erasure’ and urging Europe to restore its ‘Western identity’ and recognise its own greatness.
Whilst all these critiques are valid, it must be stated that for many decades it was America’s express desire to render Europe in precisely the state it is in now. It was America which chose to assume responsibilities for European security and tempt the continent into a slumbering impotence to ensure its allegiance following the Second World War. It was principally from America that notions of global justice, scepticism of national identity, antiracism, and universalism originated. It is therefore unsurprising that the reaction in Europe will be highly defensive, both from those in the dysfunctional establishment of American design and from those who oppose this and have always recognised it as an instrument of American power.
The Trump Administration must therefore be careful with the way in which these critiques are delivered. Much as Trump’s posture towards Canada paved the way for a surprise eleventh-hour surge by the Liberals in April, there is a significant risk that his actions towards Europe will strengthen public support for existing elites. This runs directly counter to the NSS’s stated aims of seeing governing parties replaced. It is crucial to the success of the administration’s strategy that this goal is achieved. To reiterate: the current crop of European leaders will not course correct. They live in a fantasy world which does not contain real constraints. The infallible Fraser Nelson tweeted that the NSS was ‘like America issuing divorce proceedings against Europe’. In fact, it is only Europe’s ruling class that is being let out to dry; nonetheless, if the US is unable to win the hearts and minds of Europeans, this clean swap will not occur.
With that in mind the NSS states ‘the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives cause for great optimism’, and ‘cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations’ is a priority. What this means in practice remains to be seen. It is of course unclear the extent to which the administration has gained full control over the machinery of government. Dismantling USAID was a major step in the right direction, but the State Department itself has long been responsible for a great deal of activity which runs counter to these aims.
Moreover, there is an ongoing dispute within the administration on how savings from the USAID closure should be used. Pimlico Journal spoke with a senior state department appointee who suggested that a large group aligned with VP Vance is keen to redirect public funds towards the aims of the right, including internationally — but there is a competing faction that wishes to pocket the savings in a futile attempt to reduce government spending. One notes that this faction always seems most keen to achieve such savings by avoiding spending on key right-wing political and policy priorities, much as they did over ICE funding and border controls during the debate over the ‘Big Beautiful Bill’.
Assuming that intervention is forthcoming and that these stated aims are genuine, it cannot come soon enough. It is already clear that incumbent powers across Europe are engaging in undemocratic suppression tactics towards right-wing parties. In France, National Rally leader Marine Le Pen was convicted in an arcane embezzlement scandal, conveniently banning her from seeking political offices for five years and thereby making her ineligible for the 2027 Presidential election. In Germany, the AfD has to contend with constant state surveillance and the threat of an outright ban, whilst its politicians are routinely assaulted in the streets to minimal response from authorities. In Britain, we are already starting to see the first attempts to suppress Reform, with increasing talk of Labour shifting to PR to prevent a Reform majority and the announcement this week of investigations into ‘foreign influence in British politics’ — clearly laying the ground to sting their primary opposition with spurious Russia connections. Keir Starmer himself, in a recent Economist interview, bluntly labelled Reform as existing outside the realm of acceptable politics in explicit contrast with the Conservatives.
An entire article could be written on the ways in which the establishment in Europe are seeking to undermine democratic norms to prevent insurgent parties seizing their power. What is important here, though, is how America will respond to these moves. They must walk the tightrope, exerting as much public and private pressure as possible without gifting incumbents a rallying cry or tainting the European right by association with what is, in Europe, a deeply unpopular Presidency.
Reform has been proactive in this regard thus far, recognising the Ukraine conflict as a potential point of differentiation from MAGA. Farage has theatrically distanced himself from Trump, encouraging Zelenskyy to reject the proposed peace deal. This is an intelligent move, especially given the limited costs due to Britain’s lack of influence over the process. Whether Farage’s support for Ukraine is genuine is impossible to say — Russia has certainly caused him enough political headaches as to create a real resentment over the years — but in any case, the Americans must see this for what it is and avoid demands of unquestioning loyalty to their goals.
Perhaps an even greater risk is the choice of ambassadors the US might make for its reformist efforts in Europe. Readers will be well aware of the myopia with which the US views European politics. The temptation to pour millions into Great Yarmouth First must be avoided. It is not inconceivable that ‘based’ officials addled by the ‘For You’ page choose to funnel resources towards Tommy and Calvin Robinson, Charlie Downes, and other dead-ends who recite the prejudices of American right-wingers regardless of their relevance or utility in the British context.
A serious effort to understand political realities in each specific European country will have to be made, along with the identification of genuinely competent and politically viable projects and individuals to support. In the early part of the twentieth century, American capital funded a wide array of European revolutionaries and was crucial to the reshaping of the continent. Such a reshaping could occur again, but it can only occur if it is done quietly, sensibly, and with a commitment to supporting that which has a genuine chance of success, rather than satisfying the pornographic instincts of American boomers.
It is also worth noting the attitude of the NSS towards the EU, although the topic is not covered in great detail. The only mention of the EU is in the following passage:
The larger issues facing Europe include activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence.
It goes without saying that a significant part of American opposition to European unity is rooted in pure self-interest: it is easier to negotiate with 38 small nation states than with one unified entity. There is also a strong faction within the American right — mostly made up of tech executives — which opposes EU regulatory control of American companies. Clearly, this hostility is something that European countries are right to oppose. We certainly disagree with the EU’s regulatory approach, but it is necessary that a sovereign Europe is able to impose its will on American multinationals.
Nevertheless, the document does not explicitly call for the dissolution of the EU, and its criticism is equally compatible with a desire for a reformed EU following a change of European governments. Despite Elon’s crashing out on X, there are many within the administration whose ambitions are far more aligned with the latter. This of course is a far more reasonable position for the US to take, given that it has no real power to effect such a dissolution. One of the most significant, yet most understated impacts of Brexit was to ensure that nationalist and euro-sceptic movements on the continent abandoned the notion of actually leaving the bloc (to the extent they ever held such ambitions in the first place). The EU will continue to exist; insecurity over American criticism is therefore unnecessary.
Despite the negative reaction it has received, the NSS lays out the only plausible future for a partnership between a strong United States and a strong Europe. We are justified in critiquing the American approach to European relations, crass and counterproductive as it has been so far. Nevertheless, the purpose of this article, and of Pimlico Journal in general, is to advise people in Britain and in Europe, not in America.
For all our hopes of a future Europe which is capable of leading the world, the United States is now and will for the foreseeable future be the most economically and militarily influential power in the world. Despite our protestations at developments in their politics, it would be senseless for Europeans to respond in spite out of hurt pride. America is a crucial part of European civilisation, and to establish a rift in the Atlantic or to abandon hope for America’s European future would be an epochal mistake. Behind the hostile rhetoric is a proposition that we should be eager to embrace — independence, and genuine partnership based in shared heritage, history, and interests.
We do not want to be an American vassal state. For the first time in a hundred years, they do not want us to be either. We are learning, painfully, that independence is a burden. It costs money, and it incurs responsibilities. It requires a great deal of work, and a seriousness of approach to the problems of the world that we have grown unused to. In short, it requires growing up. It is time we did so.
This article was written by George Spencer, our Managing Editor, and by an anonymous Pimlico Journal contributor. Have a pitch? Send it to submissions@pimlicojournal.co.uk.
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Doesn't Reform have a commitment to introducing some form of Proportional Representation as one of its main policies?