Mette Fredriksen and her governing grand coalition, comprised of her centre-left Socialdemokratiet (A), the centre-right Venstre (V), and the ex-Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s new party Moderaterne (M), which is ostensibly centrist, collectively decided in February that the best time to call an election would be now, seeking to capitalise on the post-Greenland Crisis polling swing which appeared to have sent the previously ascendant, so-called ‘far-right’ Danske Folkeparti (O) back to the political slums whilst strengthening the hand of each member of her ruling coalition.
At the time of announcement, it was my strong suspicion that an early election could backfire for Fredriksen. This is because Rasmussen, who has served as Foreign Minister since 2022, has been as much — if not more — the face of foreign affairs as Fredriksen. After all, it was Rasmussen, not Fredriksen, who visited the White House during the peak of the Greenland Crisis earlier this year. It increasingly seems to be the rule in European politics today that when the conversation turns to foreign policy (and especially Russia or the United States), the establishment parties and the status quo will massively benefit. Mette Fredriksen has therefore been incredibly unlucky that the Foreign Minister inside her government happens to be a man from a different party who is himself a two times former Prime Minister and who has been a senior minister in one form or another since 2001, with just three years in opposition in those twenty-four years, thus capturing the pro-establishment foreign policy polling bonus for himself.
Rasmussen’s status as the biggest beneficiary of this foreign policy focus poses problems for Socialdemokratiet beyond simply losing out on vote share. He is loyal only to is himself, and would have no problems booting them out of government if doing so were to his advantage. Before Fredriksen became Prime Minster, Rasmussen held the position with the blue bloc (the coalition of right-wing parties) behind him, and if the electoral arithmetic after the election supports him being in government so long as he joins the blue bloc again, back he will go.
Local elections in Denmark took place in November last year, and Fredriksen’s party was handed a historically bad result, starting with 44 mayoralties but retaining just 26 across the country, as well as losing Copenhagen for the first time since 2004 to their left-wing competitors Socialistisk Folkeparti (F), who did well in these local elections. However, whilst the right-wing parties which saw a fall in their projected vote share when the Greenland Crisis began have seen something of a rebound, it looks as though the similar fall in polling for Socialistisk Folkeparti might be more permanent.
Whilst it is true that foreign policy being the story of the day benefits the establishment, the calling of an election often broadens the political horizons. As Theresa May discovered in 2017, leaders frequently fail to define the terms of a contest, with various other issues bubbling to the surface — often including questions that could never have been anticipated. The campaign began with Danske Folkeparti leader Morten Messerschmidt being crucified for his multiple visits to Mar-A-Lago after Trump threw a tantrum because he wasn’t given the Nobel Peace Prize, and informed Denmark that he was ‘not ruling out’ taking over the Danish territory of Greenland (perhaps by force). And yet, throughout the subsequent campaign season, foreign policy has not featured especially prominently, and on election day that controversy is now a distant memory.
As the public’s shock faded, conversation at the start of this month turned to more mundane day-to-day issues such as Socialdemokratiet’s plans to try and lower retirement ages for everyone in society all the way down to 20 year olds; the regular TV debates brought the government under fire for the 124% gross increase in immigration from MENAPT countries (a Danish statistical category created in 2021 covering the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, Turkey) and Bangladesh during their tenure; and, gradually, the polls began to regress to their pre-foreign policy bonanza mean.
In my opinion, one of the biggest issues in this election was — unfortunately — the issue of clean drinking water. This is unfortunate because, as I am sure you will be shocked to hear, the water in Denmark is in fact perfectly safe and clean to drink: this is not a war-torn fifth-world African nation. The fact that this discourse was given any legitimacy by the right inherently means vote share loss, because there is no way to argue against the premise successfully if you concede truth in it. It became such a major issue that Mette Fredriksen came out at the end of the campaign and said that a national pesticide ban is an ultimate requirement for her to lead a future government.
I suspect this was nothing more than a cynical ploy to get that all-important Danish cross-party consensus which any major policy decisions require to be passed (without incident) on making Denmark compliant with the EU nitrates directive which requires a culling of herd sizes in major European beef and dairy producers, and has been the source of major protests in the Netherlands, Ireland, and at the EU Parliament and Commission in Brussels. But whether I am right or wrong, ‘you want us to have drinking water that gives people cancer’ is never a good accusation to receive.
The final event in the election which I want to speak about involves leader of the Liberal Alliance (L), Alex Vanopslagh. The Liberal Alliance is the most economically right-wing party in Denmark, enjoys a very young support base (so much so that it suffers from the voting age being 18) and, unlike the increasingly irrelevant establishment Konservative Fokeparti (K) — which previously had ties to the Republican Party — and Danske Folkeparti — which had ties to MAGA World — Vanopslagh and the Liberal Alliance had no connections to disavow, and so were not harmed electorally by association. They were already second of all the blue bloc parties, polling behind only Venstre, which had been damaged by governing in a grand coalition as well as suffering from a bland leader.
That is until Vanopslagh was asked on DR (the Danish state-funded public-service broadcaster) on March 11 if he still supported the legal sale of cocaine and amphetamines in pharmacies, as he said he did in 2023 (a typical libertarian). He answered in the negative: he had changed his mind. Unfortunately, this seems to have angered someone into leaking proof that he does indeed use cocaine, as the very next day, Ekstra Bladet shoved a camera in his face asking if he had ever used cocaine while serving as party leader. This resulted in a lengthy confession and explanation being issued on Facebook by Vanopslagh, and so the last clean party in the blue bloc capable of reaching double digits was implicated in scandal. With the election just twelve days away when this confession was forced from him, and given the reception that this revelation received from the sort of older voters from whom Vanopslagh already receives a frosty reception (it is common to hear him mocked for his ‘King of TikTok’ status by older people when asked about him), this looked like death for him and the blue bloc’s chances of getting elected.
Predictions
At the start of this election — when it looked like foreign policy would be the dominant issue — it seemed that the most likely outcome would be a continuation of the same governing coalition, albeit with a stronger Lars Løkke Rasmussen. Now, it looks like this will be mathematically impossible as both Socialdemokratiet and Venstre bleed vote share. I feel confident in saying that Venstre — which, as an aside, means ‘Left’ in Danish (because they used to sit on the left side of parliament) — will accrue the worst result in their party’s history and will still finish behind LA despite CocaineGate, and possibly behind Danske Folkeparti as well. Beyond this, another grand coalition would likely be political suicide for all involved — especially in a country where there is not even a cordon sanitaire which justifies excluding certain parties of the right.
Polls show neither the blue bloc nor the red bloc securing enough seats to form a majority on their own, with the two entering election day neck-and-neck, but this does not account for two important things. The first is that Denmark elects 179 seats in its parliament (allocated under the D’Hondt Method with a 2% minimum national vote share required for seats), but only 175 represent Denmark proper, with 2 representing the Faroe Islands and 2 representing Greenland. Normally, Greenland’s representatives are red and Faroe’s are split. However, in part because of foreign policy, it looks as though both of Faroe’s seats will be blue, and Greenland will be split — an important advantage for the blue bloc compared to normal elections.
The second is that Lars Løkke Rasmussen, who is best positioned to gain seats at this election (a major reversal in fortunes from the local elections, at which his party received only 1% of the vote) is not counted in either the red bloc or blue bloc. Lars Løkke Rasmussen may, in theory, have other views, but his only true political commitment is that he should be in government. He has already publicly stated that he would like the king’s blessing to negotiate a new government, and it is my belief that if he is offered his current job of foreign minister by the blue bloc he will take it. Whilst he has declared a red line against joining a coalition with Danske Folkeparti, he previously served as Prime Minister for Venstre (before setting in motion the series of events steadily leading to their destruction) whilst using Danske Folkeparti as a confidence-and-supply partner. For that reason, I think we can safely expect his first principle of politics to override this ‘red line’.
It is, of course, very difficult to predict the ultimate result of an election in which the polls are so close, from which all three of the ‘traditional’ outcomes (left bloc, right bloc, and grand coalition) seem impossible, and where various ‘red lines’ block any other combination. Someone, somewhere is bluffing, even if they themselves don’t know it yet, but we won’t be able to do better than guess about who until tomorrow morning at the earliest.
A casual guide to Danish political parties for the English reader
Enhedlisten (Ø). ‘Red-Green Alliance’ (lit. ‘The Unity List)
The ‘gimmie more PIP, I have too much anxiety to work!’ woke party. Polling at 7% (previous election 5% and 9 seats).
Alternativet (Å). ‘The Alternative’
Inseparable from the aforementioned Enhedlisten. Discovered it was actually something separate just last week. Polling at around 2-3% (previous election 3% and 6 seats).
Socialistisk Folkeparty (F). ‘The Green Left’ (lit. ‘Socialist People’s Party’)
The woke party for people who are actually employed. Polling at 13% (previous election 8% and 15 seats).
Socialdemokratiet (A). ‘Social Democrats’
Danish Labour. Polling at 21% (previous election 28% and 50 seats).
Radikale Venstre (B). ‘Social Liberals’ (lit. ‘Radical Left’)
The male feminist party. Polling at 5% (previous election 4% and 7 seats).
Moderaterne (M). ‘The Moderates’
The Lars Løkke Party. Literally the party from Borgen s3. Polling at 6% (previous election 9% and 16 seats).
Venstre (V). ‘The Left’
The rural wing of the Tory Party. Polling at 9% (previous election 13% and 23 seats).
Det Konservative Folkeparti (C). ‘The Conservatives’ (lit. ‘The Conservative People’s Party)
The Emily Hewertson and Nick Timothy wing of the Tory Party, i.e., the Tory Party as it is today. Polling at 7% (previous election 6% and 10 seats).
Danmarks Demokraterne (Æ). ‘Denmark’s Democrats’
The Tommy Robinson Party. Polling at 7% (previous election 8% and 14 seats).
Liberal Alliance (L). ‘Liberal Alliance’
The Robert Jenrick wing of the Tory Party before he defected. Polling at 11% (previous election 8% and 14 seats).
Danske Folkeparti (O). ‘Danish People’s Party’
The Gaffers. Polling at 8% (previous election 3% and 5 seats).
Borgernes Parti (H). ‘New Right’ (lit. ‘The Citizens’ Party’)
A poor imitation of Prime UKIP. Polling at around 2-3% (previous election 4% and 6 seats).
Total red bloc polling: 48-49%
Total blue bloc polling: 44-45%
Governing coalition polling: 36%
This article was written by Christopher Danby-Lloyd, a Pimlico Journal contributor. Have a pitch? Send it to submissions@pimlicojournal.co.uk.
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Idiots voting for idiots. No further explaining required.