The story of postwar Australia might be written as one of perpetually unresolved identity crises. September this year, in conversation with former Prime Minister Paul Keating, historian James Curran referred to this challenge as Australia’s ‘endless coming of age’.1 Certainly, in the context of a political climate increasingly marked by immigration discourse, questions of who Australians are emerge all the more pertinent. On one side of the debate stand the multiculturalists, those who advocate for a ‘modern’ Australian identity removed from its racialist past. On the other side stands an assortment of different positions, from the implicitly racist civic nationalist to the white nationalist, a strain of which has seen an increased uptake online over the last year. The strain in question, which I will refer to from here on as ‘Britishism’, is the very subject of this piece.
In essence, Britishism is the equation of ‘Australian’ with ‘British’. It may seem absurd, but this equation is apparently, for some, so sacred that even ‘Anglo-Celtic’ is thought to be a subversive term.2 On the surface, Britishism has grown out of an effort to engage in historical revisionism about Australian identity, combating both the institutionally dominant multiculturalist view of modern Australia and the minority nativist view of a longstanding wholly independent White Australian identity. However, it is much more than an attempted correction of historical fact by means of well-motivated amateur scholarship, despite its abdication of any responsibility to entertain the extent to which the position is politically viable.
Indeed, in this piece, I will do what too few have thought necessary, and explore with adequate nuance both the historical and contemporary factors that undermine the emergent Britishism in the online Australian Right. It must be clarified from the outset that I do not advocate for some anti-British political orientation, and nor do I subscribe to the ‘nationalist’ interpretation of Australian history associated with Russel Ward.3 In fact, Ward’s Australian Legend forms no part of my historical argument. What I will argue for, however, is both the historical fatedness towards, and contemporary necessity of, an independent Australia. Not an isolationist Australia, not an insular Australia, not an Australia unconditionally averse to thinking beyond itself. But, as an alternative to what will be proven a political non-starter in Britishism, an Australia that honestly confronts its all-consuming existential contradiction: being an historically white nation alone in the non-white world. To be sure, the irony of writing all this in a British publication with a predominantly British audience is not lost on me.
First, though, we must clarify what Britishism is, as a phenomenon unique to the Australian political sphere not reducible to, but in some respects a variant of, the renewed Anglo-Saxonism in England today. Britishism cannot merely be an affirmation of the genetic composition of ‘true’ Australians. That Australians are largely born of stock originally from the British Isles is uncontroversial and widely acknowledged to this day. It, too, is not merely a single demand for the exclusive racial political right of white Australians over the territory of Australia. Such a position might encounter accusations of ‘petty nationalism’ even though, as will become clear later, Britishism itself is vulnerable to these charges. Moreover, it is not simply a call for cooperation between states of similar heritage. After all, we already have the same head of state and shared legal tradition, close economic ties formalised in a free trade agreement (A-UKFTA), close defence ties headlined by AUKUS, frequent bilateral ministerial consultations, intelligence sharing through Five Eyes, similar mass entertainment, mutual membership of the Commonwealth, and reasonable mobility between countries.
At its core, though it often shies away from a political articulation of itself, Britishism is simply the affirmation of an ultimately shared political subjectivity that transcends state boundaries, that of the ‘British people(s)’. Transnational subjectivity on the Right is not unique to Britishism. It is a defining feature of white identitarianism at large.4 However, the foundational dishonesty of Britishism is its conflation of ‘doing history’ and the act of political prescription, a designation of what ought to be the case, with little effort to entertain it even somewhat pragmatically or philosophically. Britishism’s weakness is its attempt to normativise the past as the present in a way that obscures the domain of possibility in contemporary politics, thereby rendering it a movement that engages in historical inquiry with explicitly political motives, but in the process simultaneously undermines its scholarly integrity and misunderstands politics as the simple overlaying of the past onto the present.
My critique of Britishism is twofold, and will be developed on an historical front and a conceptual front. The first section will deal with the historical factors that contributed to the separation between Britain and Australia, and will enable the reader to understand ‘white British’ Australian identity as something that was contingent on material conditions. Once these conditions changed, eliminating the pillars integral to the imperial relationship and transnational British racial consciousness, the reader will understand that separation between the two was a consequence that desperate assertions of ‘We were British!’ cannot fully overcome today. In the article to follow, I will then engage on a more conceptual level with the shortfalls of Britishism as a contemporary political position because, despite its protestations, that is what Britishism fundamentally is. Given that I criticise the inability of Britishists to coherently formulate their position on a pragmatic political level, it is only fair that I will also offer up my own prescription for Australia’s political future, albeit expediently. I will explore how the idea of an independent Australia is not necessarily incompatible with a secondary hemispheric or supra-national orientation (though I stop short of endorsing such a view), how the British pining for a romantic reconstructed view of Empire is precluded by a competing ideal of ‘European civilisation’, and the dilemma of British existential concerns being bound up with Europe.
1. The Limits of (Neo-)Imperial Federation and the End of British Australia
The Britishist position finds its, if I may, British counterpart in the Anglo-Saxonism promoted by segments of the British Right. There is, in this sense, a political model that is ripe for the taking for those Australians who find themselves enamoured with Britishism, for it at least purports to guarantee a requisite transnational political subjectivity. In August, George Ruska’s ‘Understanding Churchill’s Americanism’ offered a well-expressed political prescription in light of his historical writing. He summarises the Anglo-Saxonist ideal to which we are called to aspire as the ‘association, and eventual union of, free, sovereign, and demographically secure British nations’.5 Without wishing to put words in Ruska’s mouth, this ideal amounts to, at least functionally, the advent of a neo-imperial federation. In other words, a political union of member states based on their shared Anglo-Saxonness, the structure of which is surely reminiscent of the proposed imperial federation of the British Empire.
While it is inarguable that the shared experience of mass immigration has raised the racial consciousness of many white — dare I utter the apparently blasphemous ‘Anglo-Celtic’ — people across the Anglosphere, it would be bereft of the Australian to entertain this ideal of neo-empire or neo-imperial federation without recourse to history. Why, it should be asked, did Australia not enter into an imperial federation with Britain to begin with? More significantly, why did the course of Britain and Australia decisively diverge in the wake of the Second World War? Much to the dismay of those quick to sensationalise, no, it was not the result of some communist Jewish plot. This polemic, that sceptics of Australian Britishism should be painted with a Judeo-Bolshevik brush, is a perfect example of why this ‘historical revisionism’ is more appropriately understood as a thinly-veiled and shallow political intervention. Contrary to the red scare explanation, we can safely determine, now endowed with the gift of hindsight, that the separation of Australia and Britain, in respect of both culture and interest, was the consequence of a complex confluence of factors, many outside the control of both.
1.1 From imperial federation to the waning of military dependence
The cause of imperial federation in Australia at the turn of the nineteenth century did not enjoy popularity amongst the political leadership. As Neville Meaney writes, ‘From the outset, Australian leaders, even many of those who had imbibed most deeply of the British race sentiment, had difficulties in accepting the Imperial Federationists’ proposal for a political union.’6 Imperial federation had long evaded a precise formulation beyond the desire for closer political union that entailed common policymaking within the Empire, and though the leaders of Australian federation inarguably felt a deep sense of ‘Britishness’ (both cultural and racial), the prospect of an imperial federation remained unlikely after Australia’s own federation. Between 1901 and the beginning of the First World War, ‘[Australia] neither rejected a possible imperial union nor endorsed such a future.’7 There were various reasons for Australia’s ambivalence towards imperial federation, per Meaney:
Britain’s commitment to free trade stood in the way of colonial economic development; Britain’s need for Asian allies and its sensitivity to the feelings of its dependent Empire in India made it unsympathetic to Australia’s ‘Whites Only’ immigration policy; Britain’s preoccupation with the balance of power in Europe caused it to give a low priority or to be indifferent to Pacific defence and foreign problems. As a result there was a lack of harmony between Australia’s community of culture and community of interest, and when these ideas of community clashed the Australians, even if they found it uncomfortable to do so, chose the nation of interest over the nation of culture.8
This distinction between community of interest and community of culture speaks to the existential contradiction of Australia outlined earlier, namely the existence of an historically white nation in a far-flung non-white part of the world. The tensions between these two modes of community that constituted Australian political life, the self-perception of Australians as white British and the localised material interests derived from political necessity, represent at a surprisingly early point in Australia’s history faint glimmers of an almost inevitable trajectory towards rupture with a transnational consciousness. It would be misleading to contend, however, that this contradiction was thrust upon Australians who would have otherwise sought a wholly separate identity without recourse to white Britishness.
To some, the white Britishness of Australian identity may appear non-autonomous in every sense, but this was certainly not the case. Australians desired a high degree of autonomy in the context of seeing themselves as a British people, for ‘while enthusiastically adopting Britishness as their national myth, [Australians] would not accept any form of imperial federation in which Britain, because of its greater population and therefore voting power, would be able to dispose of Australia’s resources or direct its policies as it saw fit.’9 Australians held true to these two ideas at the same time, though, as the chasm between the community of culture and community of interest widened, this tightrope became increasingly difficult to walk.
The Australian attitude toward imperial federation worsened during the First World War, when Billy Hughes, the ardent imperialist Prime Minister who had until that point looked favourably on the idea, was confronted with the one-sidedness of Lloyd George’s Imperial War Cabinet. Citing Meaney once more:
In practice Lloyd George was not willing to be hamstrung in making Britain’s world policy. He would not allow Britain’s freedom of action to be limited by what in effect was a Dominion right of veto. As the end of the war drew near and the question of peace terms moved to centre stage Hughes saw Lloyd George’s unilateral decision-making as a betrayal of the imperial idea, and he complained to his colleagues in Melbourne that there was ‘no imperial Government in this great crisis, although there may be an Imperial War Cabinet’.10
It was Hughes’ imperial loyalty, and the Australian desire to maintain British racial unity, that led him to despair to Lloyd George that if Australian representatives in London were not given fair weight in decision-making, ‘these Conferences will fall into disrepute… and we shall begin to drift apart. Perhaps you may think me a pessimist. But I am not. And I am most certainly if any man is a whole-hearted champion of Empire.’11 Even before the war, Frederic Eggleston, who Stuart Ward remarks was nothing but a ‘renowned Australian imperialist’, concluded in a 1912 essay, ‘Hitherto Australians have relied upon England alone for the conduct of policy, and willingly; for they conceived the interests of both parts of the Empire to be the same. Now that we find that the defence of Australia depends upon an entirely different set of problems from those which face England, the Australian point of view is inclined to change.’12
The Australian relationship to the prospect of imperial federation, therefore, can be summarised as one of initial apprehension (though there was widespread desire to maintain unity with Britain) that developed into opposition. With time, the idea of imperial federation was abandoned, and the relationship between Britain and Australia continued less along the lines of Joseph Chamberlain’s vision and more in accordance with that of Australia’s first Prime Minister Edmund Barton who, as John Hirst writes, ‘saw the federation of Australia as part of a larger project of empire unity’, though ‘unlike Chamberlain, he did not think unity required formal ties… the bonds were kinship, war, and the recognition of the principle of full self-government’.13 That said, Australian opposition to imperial federation ought not be misconstrued as a desire to go its own way, for ‘Australia’s population was, as it boasted, 99 per cent British; and Britain remained vital in trade and was taken to be crucial for defence.’14
The failure of imperial federation to come to fruition does not in its own right demonstrate a fracturing of the relationship between Australia and Britain, but it does hint at the contradiction of Australia’s political existence. That Alfred Deakin’s ‘experience over many years with the British government had been so disillusioning that by 1910, in his last great speech in Parliament’ he warned that ‘despite herself Australia was being forced to adopt a foreign policy of her own’, is difficult to ignore.15 Appraising Deakin’s attitude, Ward writes that ‘in spite of a perceived British civic and cultural ethos which united the Australians and the British as one people, the realities of divergent security concerns compelled him to fashion a national defence and foreign policy.’16 Undoubtedly, the pan-British ethnic framework, which ‘only during the late-Victorian atmosphere of looming crisis colonial identities became securely anchored within’, consumed the political consciousness of newly federated Australia but clearly, at the same time, brought to the surface a conflict of interest that culminated in the severing of imperial ties after the Second World War.17
Nevertheless, tensions pertaining to defence were suppressed for longer than many might expect, if only because of the deep affinity between the British and Australians for their shared racial destiny. For example, while in 1909 the British initially failed to honour their commitment to the Australians to maintain a Pacific naval fleet, they did belatedly capitulate to Australian insistence and by 1914 Australia was endowed with a sizable fleet. However, this could not shake the fact that the unique geographic situatedness of Australia proliferated its unwavering desire to form its own foreign and defence policy — it is called the Antipodes for a reason! — and it cannot be understated how this necessary separation of interest contained the potential for future fracture. Of course, ANZACs in the First World War fought for Empire – there is no disputing this – but it is worth acknowledging that ‘though [Australia] had been quick to accept compulsion for home defence [in the Empire’s struggle with the Central Powers], Australians would not agree to conscript for European service.’18 Herein lies the essence of the Australian dilemma, an isolation so profound that it confers a certain civilisational estrangement.
As the Second World War approached, the Australian diplomatic position aligned with the British, but ‘for [Australia’s] own reasons and it is these reasons which explain why the Australian cabinet was more strongly in favour of appeasement than the British government.’19 Quoting Robert Menzies, Meaney perfectly captures the tensions that arose from divergent defence interests prior to the war:
…slowly the full realisation of Australia’s Pacific isolation penetrated even the most British and Imperial of Australia’s political leaders, and R.G. Menzies, in his inaugural address as Prime Minister on April 26, 1939, expressed the Australian anxiety in words very reminiscent of Alfred Deakin’s. ‘What Great Britain calls the Far East,’ he said (coining an enduring and apposite phrase), ‘is to us the near north’.20
Menzies’ anxiety was not unfounded, for the inadequacy of British defences in the Pacific was marked by the fall of Singapore in 1942. Whether Britain was completely blameworthy for this — Australia, for its part, too readily accepted assurances of the robustness of Singapore defences — is beyond the point. Ultimately, the consequence was that ‘reliance on the British was no longer seen as an adequate basis for Australian security’, and this was the first major blow to the Britain-Australia relationship.21 British weakness in the latter part of the war led to a newfound dependence on America for security in the Pacific, and Australia resented both ‘the arbitrary action of Britain and America’, which is why it signed the Anzac Agreement with New Zealand in 1944.22 Notwithstanding the continued affections for the white Britishness of Australian identity widely held by the political establishment, including foreign minister H.V. Evatt, material reality set in, and ‘While [Australia] would have preferred to rely on Britain, the war had revealed Britain’s inability to defend its Pacific dominions and Australia had no choice but to put America in Britain’s place.’23
Though this does not directly undermine the idea of a new Anglo-Saxonist federation, which could theoretically be headed up by the United States, it is worth remembering that we are dealing here in this essay with the question of Australian identity. It is evident that, in their attempts to objectively cast Australian identity as British, the Britishists overlook the necessity of a sustained existential relationship in the maintenance of Australia’s self-perception as British. One may lament that the Britain-Australia defence relationship withered as a result of the Second World War, but it remains unavoidable that the collapse of British security in the Pacific had as its natural consequence an erosion of the synonymity between ‘Australian’ and ‘British’, and propelled Australia along the path to more independently minded political thinking. This is not attributable to a handful of communists masquerading as nativists, who are made out to have exuded some elaborate conspiratorial genius in their subversion of Australia through cute songs about the bush. Rather, it was the outcome of a global conflict whose implications were borne on a global scale.
1.2 Au revoir, Ottawa
Economic relations between Britain and Australia endured a while longer, though they too were the source of inevitable separation between two states previously bound by a deep sense of shared racial identity. After the war, the prevailing system of Empire trade, which emerged from the Ottawa conference of 1932, came under immense pressure. Growing Asian markets and a crippled British economy were two factors among many in the deterioration of the trading relationship between Australia and Britain. In the 1950s, senior Australian trade bureaucrat John Crawford perceived that ‘the Ottawa system was in irreversible decline, and stated that “his advice would be unequivocally in favour of [Britain] joining the common market”’.24 That Crawford was still advising the British what was in their best interest — it must be conceded, though, that he only offered such advice with the view that the Australian economy would not be impacted by the UK joining the Common Market — does convey the bittersweet nature of this drawn out economic divorce. The balance of trade between Australia and Britain had, in Australia’s view, become far too imbalanced in favour of the British, and then-treasurer John McEwen journeyed over with Menzies to correct this. The main purpose of his visit to London, he said, ‘was the review of the Ottawa Agreement. The British were, however, very reluctant to renegotiate the treaty and for some time Crawford and I met nothing but intransigence.’25 Though Australian concerns were briefly allayed after some concessions were made, the friction between British and Australian economic interests were accentuated in this period of negotiations.
On the British side, John Singleton writes that in the late 1950s, ‘[t]he struggle against Australia did not cause Britain to reject the Commonwealth in favour of Europe, but it did persuade ministers that the Commonwealth economic network was a wasting asset.’26 Indeed, the economic relationship during the 1950s can be summarised as the ‘gradual diminution of trust between the British and the Australian and New Zealand governments.’27 At the same time, America was pushing for Australia to meet the needs of Asian economies, arguing that the Australians ‘were ideal providers of food and raw materials to Asia, as well as convenient outlets for Japanese goods.’28 Australia honoured its preference for Britain and continued protecting British manufactured goods during this process, but it became untenable because of fundamental issues with the economics of Sterling.29 During Britain’s early discussions with the Six — Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands — Crawford attacked the Board of Trade’s Permanent Secretary (Frank Lee) as being dismissive of Australia’s situation. Singleton writes, ‘At a time when Commonwealth unity was most needed, argued Crawford, Lee’s lukewarm attitude could be interpreted as presaging a split between the UK… and the remainder of the Commonwealth.’30
So, while Australia — encouraged by America — continued along its natural pivot towards Asia, Britain was turning away from the Commonwealth and realising that it needed to become closer with Europe.31 This twofold process, particularly Britain’s pursuit of ‘Plan G’, a negotiating plan which sought British membership in a European free trade area for industrial goods, led Alec Douglas-Home to affirm that ‘as the United Kingdom turned to Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand… must be expected to turn increasingly towards the United States.’32 The significance of Britain’s journey towards membership of the European Economic Community became more pronounced with time, and Anthony Eden ‘acknowledged with deep regret that it was no longer possible to base British commercial policy on the Commonwealth’.33 Australia was acutely aware of Britain’s predicament, as it was of its own, and became increasingly resigned to economic separation when in 1959 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan refused to allow the Commonwealth ‘to stand in the way of whatever he deemed to be in the long-term interests of British industry’.34 Australia and other Commonwealth nations began to take the view that ‘Britain was in danger of becoming a supplicant in Brussels’ and prepared accordingly.35 Like the defence pillar, the economic pillar of imperial unity was beginning to crumble.
As the 1960s rolled on, Australian bureaucrats accepted that Australia had already turned away from Britain because of the latter’s lack of interest in the Commonwealth. The cumulative effect of this was exacerbated by the fact that defence ties ‘had already lost much of [their] significance.’36 Despite any good intentions of either side, the economic interdependence between Australia and Britain was not to be. For Harold Wilson (who could hardly be claimed to be a devout Europeanist or strong sceptic of the Commonwealth), the Australian desire to enter into a meaningful bilateral trade agreement with the United Kingdom was unwelcome, for by 1966 he ‘had come to the conclusion that Europe offered better long-term opportunities.’37 The Americans, meanwhile, were firmly against the proliferation of preferential trade arrangements within the Commonwealth, and were therefore of no help to the Australians.38 Singleton aptly summarises the whole process:
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand were driven apart by changing perceptions of national self-interest, and by evolving commercial and financial incentives. Australia and New Zealand believed that import substitution industrialisation would best serve their interests. The inability of Britain to provide rapidly growing markets and endless supplies of capital impelled the dominions to seek new economic partnerships in Asia and North America. Meanwhile, the pull of continental European markets persuaded the British government to devalue the Commonwealth economic relationship. Australia and New Zealand were, in Konrad Adenauer’s telling phrase, invited to ‘swim off’.39
The continued existence of the British Commonwealth was, arguably, as dependent on continued economic relations as it was defence relations. As such, the collapse of the Britain-Australia trade relationship, marked by Britain’s turn to Europe and Australia’s turn to Asia respectively, ought to be understood as the hand that rang the death knell of imperial unity, and with it, any transnational British consciousness. The dissolution of close economic and military ties removed the buffer that kept Australia’s existential crisis at bay, and it is no surprise that a consequence of this is a political schizophrenia symptomatic of the very Britishism we see today. Schreuder and Ward put it perfectly when they concluded that ‘this insistence on the durability of Australian Britishness in the face of the realities of imperial decline could not withstand the logic of a different set of realities, namely the changing attitudes in Britain towards the value and utility of the Commonwealth.’40 This logic still governs Australia today, and the denial of this by Britishists only serves to relegate Britishism deeper into a position of impractical fantasticality.
1.3 Populate and Perish?
Though the military and economic ties were a shadow of their former selves, one might be inclined to argue that the demographic connection between the two countries was such that a shared identity could have remained intact in the long-term. However, concurrent with economic separation was a transformation of Britain and Australia’s migration policies. Because demographic exchange was ‘fundamental to all the connections between Britain and Australia’, as Eric Richards remarks, it follows that as the migration profile of the respective countries changed, the connection between the two was weakened.41 The impact of this shift in migration policy should not be viewed exclusively through the dilution of ‘white British’ as a percentage of each country’s population. Rather, it should above all be understood as a qualitative change culminating in the institutional abandonment of the ideal of whiteness. The fallout of this, in combination with the aforementioned factors, removed the material conditions required for the continuation of a transnational political consciousness.
1948 marked a major change in British migration policy, with the British Nationality Act conferring upon all Commonwealth subjects ‘the explicit right to enter, reside and work in Britain, which coincided with a large influx of migrants from [the West Indies, West Africa, India, and Pakistan].’42 When the British regretted their decision and moved to discreetly hinder the new flows of migrants, Australians complained to London that the British did not distinguish between themselves and non-white British subjects, for Australia viewed the imperial relationship as one of white unity with little regard for non-white members of the British Commonwealth. Evan Smith writes that ‘British officials noted that the Australians supposedly resented the unwillingness of the British to openly admit that the impending [restrictive] legislation was to “limit the number of coloured immigrants”’.43 At the same time, Britain was also taking in migrants from Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Cyprus, and Malta, inadvertently laying the foundations for a move away from a racially British society.
Meanwhile, in Australia, the recent threat of invasion caused policymakers to obsessively focus on securing Australia in a Pacific no longer guaranteed by the British. An integral part of this was increasing Australia’s population, something that had already been discussed for quite some time prior. Before the war, ‘in Britain itself, there was opinion telling Australia that it should begin to think in the way that the United States had been populated’, and ‘[i]n 1938 the Oversea Settlement Board advised the Dominions to seek “a carefully regulated flow from other countries whose people are of broadly the same stock as ourselves, and who have a similar outlook”, such as Scandinavia.’44 Moreover, in 1943, the ‘[Australian] government received a memorandum from the British government recognising this need for increased migration to Australia for defence and national development’, suggesting once more that ‘Australia look to Europe if there was a shortfall in migrants from the United Kingdom.’45 These concerns foreshadowed what would become the ‘Populate or Perish’ postwar immigration campaign.
There is a strange tendency of some to depict the immigration minister who presided over Australia’s early postwar migration, Arthur Calwell, as some anti-white subversive. Devoid of good intention, this ‘argument’ makes recourse to the opening up of Australia to non-British European arrivals and a brief period that saw an intake of Jewish refugees after the Second World War. Such unreflective hostility towards the man who was to be the final major party leader to support the White Australia Policy is nothing more than an infantile narrow-mindedness that seeks intensely personalistic explanations for complex historical processes born of many causes. The notion that ‘Populate or Perish’ originated with Calwell is unfathomably ignorant of history and the treatment of him as a champion of multiculturalism (in the way we understand it today) is even more absurd. To understand why, all one must do is situate the Australian turn to continental migrants in its right context.
It has already been noted that the official ‘Populate or Perish’ campaign was born of Australian insecurities about under-population at the end of the war and was preceded by advice from the British that accorded with these anxieties. However, the origin of ‘Populate or Perish’ goes back further.46 In 1936, a conference convened by the Royal Society of St George in Queensland ‘affirmed the urgent necessity for a resumption of British migration to Australia’, with The Courier Mail adding that ‘Australia must also be prepared to welcome other nationals of kindred racial stock and culture who have the will and find the way to make this continent their home’.47 The rationale for the latter comment was grounded in the fact that ‘a younger Britain offered harbourage and liberty to peoples from the continent of Europe and was glad to add their arts and industry to the nation’s wealth’, so Australia too should be willing to welcome people from Europe.48 This view is not attributable to a crypto-communist takeover of Australia by stealth, unless The Times also fell victim to such wizardry in London when it said two years earlier that ‘a White Australia policy… cannot be safe so long as it implies or seems to imply an empty Australia’.49 That same year, as Evan Smith and others write, Somerset de Chair, a Tory MP, ‘recognised that upholding this policy of racial purity came at a strategic cost, and with a population of “only 6,500,000”, Australia had to “realise that that is bound to be dangerous”’.50
Going back further, a full decade before the 1934 Times editorial, former Governor-General Lord Denman spoke in the House of Lords about the exacerbation of Australia’s security vulnerabilities due to under-population, highlighting a predicament in which the British elite, though sharing in the racial ideal of Australia, eventually resolved to ‘[favour] large-scale migration of non-British migrants into the northern territories of Australia to prevent this “empty land” from being invaded’.51 It goes without saying that much of the fervour for migration in the lead up to the Second World War was for British migrants in particular, but evidently there was a concurrent softening to continental Europe in many quarters.
By the 1940s, the Australian government began to seriously consider the question of population growth, and it was during this period that the term uttered by Prime Ministers Joseph Cook and Billy Hughes in preceding decades — ‘Populate or Perish’ — came to characterise the new immigration drive.52 Contrary to the idea that a demon appeared to Calwell in a dream and aroused in him a newfound pursuit of the eradication of Australia, the Curtin cabinet together established the inter-departmental committee on immigration in 1943 with good intentions.53 One of the members of this committee was public servant W.D. Forsyth who had, the year prior, published the influential book The Myth of Open Spaces.54 The thesis of Forsyth’s book is twofold, as John B. Condliffe summarises in review: ‘The first is that opportunities for settlement in the open spaces of oversea or colonial lands are much smaller than is commonly thought. The other is that the sources of European emigration are rapidly drying up.’55 The second of these two contentions is most integral for ascertaining the institutional shift towards Australia’s openness to European migration in the 1940s and beyond. Condliffe continues, ‘[i]n a broad sense [Forsyth] writes an epitaph to the nineteenth-century expansion of northwestern European peoples’, and inscribed on this epitaph is the expectation that ‘[s]ince few emigrants are likely to be available from northern and western Europe, and since Australia is adamant against Asiatic immigration, the only likely source is central and eastern Europe.’56
The second major document produced in this period was the 1945 White Paper Full Employment in Australia, co-written by H.C. Coombs (who would later become the first Reserve Bank governor), which ‘advocated [for large-scale immigration to enter] a new phase of industrialisation which would take the country beyond a reliance on rural exports to Briain’.57 This received bipartisan support, including from Australia’s preeminent demographer W.D. Borrie. That same year, Calwell published his pamphlet How Many Australians Tomorrow? which advocated for a sober realism towards the ‘controversial question’ of continental European migration for the sake of industrial expansion and defence.58 The preference for British migration and the recognition of a need to expand the population were not mutually exclusive, and the view that Calwell’s stance is reducible to a subversive streak is nonsensical. As the National Archives of Australia remark:
Public opinion polls showed that a great majority of people believed Australia needed a much larger population and thought that this would best be achieved by larger families. Politicians, community leaders, journalists and other commentators shared this view. In 1943 both John Curtin and Robert Menzies claimed that the population needed to double in the next 20 years, while Frank Forde went further, suggesting that it needed to reach 30 million in the next 30 years.59
There is an absurd argument on the Australian far-right which argues that Calwell far exceeded this general license by admitting Jews. In this process, one might also make contextless recourse to Calwell’s later remark that without European migration Australia would be ‘a dull inbred country of predominantly British stock’.60
To deal swiftly with the latter point first, Calwell can quite rightly be depicted as lacking the requisite Anglophilia for Britishists’ tastes, but he clearly subscribed to a form of white nationalism that was of pan-European character. As Jayne Persian writes, ‘Calwell was a visionary who sought to remake Australia in America’s (demographic) image’, referring not to what America is today, but a move towards a pan-European conception of whiteness.
That an Australian-born man could somehow, after forty years of federation, begin to develop some sense of racial identity disproportionately removed from a British-centric conception, and like Alfred Deakin admire the United States, should not arouse shock, let alone contempt.61 Calwell made a similar comment about the ‘inbreeding’ of the Australian population in 1967 and this excerpt accords with the notion that he was doing so not for reasons of anti-white hatred, but as a pan-European white nationalist, saying ‘I welcomed the infusion of European blood because it gave us what I would like to call a biological transfusion’.62 This may not satisfy the Britishist, for it promotes a vision of whiteness that goes beyond Britishness, but it does not render Calwell an ‘anti-white traitor’. In any case, the demographic situation of Britain was still important to Calwell, as Neville Kirk’s research has shown. It remains underappreciated that ‘as revealed in his papers, Calwell drew great strength for his defence of “White Australia” not only from domestic and regional considerations, but also from the troubled experiences of Britain’.63
As for the former point, it is true that the number of Jewish immigrants to Australia shortly after the war trailed only behind the United States and Israel. Malcontents use this to demonstrate his foaming-at-the-mouth hatred of White Australia.64 Of course, like all other Calwell hate, this has minimal regard for both context and truth, and is probably the product of a cognitive dissonance that refuses to accept that someone influenced by early Fabianism could have held genuine affection for a racial political identity.65 Australia’s acceptance of around 17,000 Jewish refugees over five years is compared to Britain, which admitted only several thousand Jews in the first few years after the war. This, however, overlooks the fact that the British took in approximately 80,000 Jews between 1933 and 1945, while Australia brought in around 7,000.66
Though I certainly do not think Calwell’s reputation today hinges on this, and find it both regrettable and ridiculous that the pettiness of the Online Right in 2026 is such that they feel the need to declare a major historical political figure persona non grata because 4 percent of the immigration intake in 1949 were Jews whose passage was fully funded by the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), it is still necessary to address these claims, for it is emblematic of the pathology of Britishism.67
Australia’s intake of Jewish refugees was highest in 1945-47. Calwell critics will be quick to highlight the fact that Jews made up around 60 percent of the ‘very small’ 1947 intake of ≈11,000 non-British European migrants (there were also ≈12,000 British migrants) and ignore that by 1949, after he and Tasman Heyes ‘secretly introduced measures to reduce the number of Jewish survivors able to migrate’ two years earlier:
Calwell became concerned that there was an ‘alarming increase in the number of Jews entering the Commonwealth, [and] the processing of applications was delayed as far as possible’. This measure was followed by instruction to restrict [Landing Passages] for applicants from Iron Curtain countries to wives, minor children and parents. It was estimated that this change would ‘curtail Jewish migration by approximately 75 per cent’ in what became known as ‘the Iron Curtain Embargo’. The incoming Menzies government maintained Calwell’s policies, so that restriction of Jewish LP migration was bipartisan.68
Proper historical inquiry can yield only one conclusion on the matter: Calwell was initially positive towards Jewish immigration, seeing it as a way to supplement the shortfalls in British migrant targets and the delay of Baltic immigration to Australia, but turned against it shortly thereafter. Assessing his motivations, Persian quotes Calwell in 1971 who said:
Primarily what I was interested in was the defence of Australia and its development, so that the people who had made this country[,] and the descendants of those[,] could be assured that they could live in peace and security… it would be wrong to say I was primarily interested in seeing that we gave a haven to oppressed peoples anywhere[,] because we could have given a haven to all the displaced and distressed people in the world.69
Even though, as Markus argues, Calwell ‘sought to present his record [with the Jewish community] in the most positive light’, the reality of Australian discrimination against Jewish migrants by Calwell’s department is well-established.70
Calwell went as far as to claim that Jewish migrants were ‘psychologically unfit’ for Australian working life, and it is rather ironic that the frenzied anti-communism of his present day critics was actually practised by his own department postwar, which ‘led to a laxity in the political screening process, whereby Nazi collaborators and fascist sympathisers, as well as members of right-wing groups such as the Serbian Chetniks and Croatian Ustashi, were able to migrate to Australia under the same conditions of “Cold War myopia” operating in other Western countries’.71 That ‘Jews were discriminated twice — firstly because of their “race” and then because of allegations that many were “Communist Agents”’ was exacerbated by the fact that simultaneously, on the question of other Displaced Persons (DPs), ‘Calwell further ignored his own security service, dismissing their evidence regarding the SS origins of some DPs as a “farrago of nonsense”’.72
The persistent Australian fixation on race, at a time when Britain was opening itself up to non-white migration, is epitomised by the behaviour of the immigration department:
Policy on the [question of Jewish immigration] was made clear in an instruction to Berlin in June 1949: ‘The term [Jew] refers to race and not to religion and the fact that some DPs who are Jewish by race have become Christian by religion is not relevant’. As a member of the Australian selection team noted critically: ‘Hitler could not have done better’.73
A decade later, while UK Labour’s 1959 manifesto affirmed that ‘the transformation of the old British Empire into the first inter-racial Commonwealth of free nations was the supreme achievement’ of Attlee’s government, the Australian Labor Party was still led by H.V. Evatt, who attacked the incumbent Menzies Liberal government for its intake of non-British European migrants, the number of which exceeded that under Calwell’s ministership almost eight times over by 1959.74 Evatt criticised Menzies for his ‘failure to preserve the British character of the country’, telling him that Australia ‘will be and must be primarily a British community’.75 Calwell replaced Evatt as leader after the latter’s death in 1959, and continued to defend the White Australia Policy, including at the 1960 New South Wales Labor state conference against a growing force in the party agitating for its removal.76 In the early years of the following decade, after Labor had removed the White Australia Policy plank from its platform, ‘[Calwell] was resigned to defeat. The ALP had changed beyond recognition and “White Australia” was on the rocks’. Perth, in Calwell’s eyes, was ‘already becoming the Durban of Australia’ and there was the prospect of ‘the creation of a chocolate-coloured Australia in the 1980s or the 2000s’.77
In summary, the only ‘offence’ Calwell committed was having a pan-European conception of whiteness that included ‘British, German, Scandinavian, Dutch, Italian, Greek, Maltese or such migrants’ instead of a narrowly British one.78 In fact, even for the fringe minority who insist on purposelessly judging historical figures based on arbitrary measures of ‘perceived anti-Semitism’ in their judgment of historical figures, the whole ‘Arthur the Terrible, Destroyer of Australia’ schtick is hard to comprehend. While I reject this minority’s low bar for historical cancellation outright, it is ironic that the preponderance of evidence actually points towards Calwell as an individual who, to a certain extent, shared rather than contravened their Judeo-Bolshevik fixation.
The final word on Calwell is best delivered with a passage written by his own hand, mounting a final defence of the White Australia Policy a year before his death:
Anybody who is not proud of his race is not a man at all. And any man who tries to stigmatise the Australian community as racist because they want to preserve this country for the white race is doing our nation a great harm. Those who talk about a multi-racial society are really talking about a polyglot nation. Some people talk about a multi-racial society without knowing what the term really means, while others talk about it because they are anxious to change our society. No matter where the pressures come from, Australian people will continue to resist all attempts to destroy our white society. I reject, in conscience, the idea that Australia should or can ever become a multi-racial society and survive.79
[…]
If Australians are ever foolish enough to open their gates in a significant way to people other than Europeans, they will soon find themselves fighting desperately to stop the nation from being flooded by hordes of non-integratables.80
Some seem to forget (or simply do not know) that Australia’s changing migration policy happened contemporaneously with a much less racially restrictive British policy that opened Britain up to the Commonwealth and Europe, creating an environment that made possible the celebrity of Enoch Powell. To the extent that Australian politicians should be individually blamed for the dissolution of the White Australia Policy, responsibility should more squarely fall upon the likes of Harold Holt, Gough Whitlam, Hubert Opperman, and Al Grassby — certainly not Arthur Calwell. The policy was rapidly dissolved after the mid-1960s and finished off by Whitlam, and Britain neither objected to this nor sought to slow the flow of migrants. British pressure on the Australians did come in the 1970s, but only for a greater intake, and ‘Thatcher’s urging for Australia to accept more refugees caused some friction between the two governments, particularly as the FCO noted that Australia’s resettlement numbers between 1975 and 1979 were nearly four times larger than Britain’s intake’.81 Commenting on the later uptick in gross numbers of British migrants to Australia, Richards concludes that Australia was lucky to have bucked the trend towards non-British migration for as long as it did:
In essence, Australia had applied artificial respiration to the British diaspora in the third quarter of the twentieth century, breathing life into a fading phenomenon. The interwar Jeremiahs were proved wrong. Yet, impressive though the revival proved to be, it was not enough; and as a consequence Australia followed the experience of the United States and Canada, long delayed, towards the rapid Europeanization of its population. This had been steadfastly resisted for 160 years but, in the event, there were few frictions between London and Canberra, essentially because this transition suited their mutual interests.82
With Australia and Britain’s race-oriented immigration policies dismantled, the ties that bound the two were irreparably frayed. From that point on, the restoration of old imperial ties was unimaginable, and this remains the case today. What proponents of Britishism fail to understand is that the political identity of Australians as White British was sustained by Australia’s dependence on the British for military protection and an aligned existential vision amongst the political class in the context of empire, a preferential and dominant trading relationship with Britain, and exclusively British migration. As each of these collapsed — granted, as I have said, due to forces outside the complete control of either — naturally too did the attachment between them fall by the wayside. This is not to say that a sense of white British racial identity was reducible to material relations, but in the way that a house whose foundation is exposed after its structure collapses tends to decay, the synonymity between Australian and British became untenable after these ‘pillars’ came crumbling down.
The view that we can simply resume things as they were in 1901 is a consequence of the anachronistic anti- or non-political approach of Britishists, which will be addressed in the next chapter. It is, in some respects, tantamount to the expectation that a couple divorced for decades — each of whom have since had many partners and formed new families — would be able to re-enter a relationship together in the same way as before their separation, as though they could somehow excise from their lives all the years in between.
It should therefore be of no wonder that recent trade and military agreements between the UK and Australia have failed to give rise to a widespread sense of renewed transnational racial identity. Choosing to disregard all of the above, a proponent of Britishism could respond to all of this by saying, ‘we do not deny that the empire is dead and that the relationship between Britain and Australia is more separate today, you are merely stating the obvious in a way that bears no relevance to our position’. All a rebuttal like this does is betray the inability of Britishists to understand historical white British political identity, and political identity in general, as in part materially related, opting to instead reframe the argument through abstraction so as to assert the ‘indisputable objectivity’ of their position. This attests to the contradictory nature of Britishism as a stance that stakes its argument for an objective ahistorical identity on the demonstration of its historical existence — a position that argues for an identity with recourse to history, but at the same time oddly discounts the historicity and contingency of that identity.
This article was written by Alger Sprunt, a Pimlico Journal contributor. Have a pitch? Send it to submissions@pimlicojournal.co.uk.
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“Grand Ambition: Paul Keating and James Curran in Conversation,” Simon & Schuster Australia, (YouTube, 11 Sep 2026),
The term ‘Anglo-Celtic’ has a long history of usage, including as far back as 1895 by Edward O’Sullivan who ‘advocated the unity of the “Anglo-Celtic race”’, and proved helpful in promoting the assimilation of the Irish in Australia; Stuart Ward, ‘Security: Defending Australia’s Empire’, in Australia’s Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 241.
For a useful reconstruction of Russel Ward’s argument, see Graeme Davison, ‘Rethinking the Australian Legend’, Australian Historical Studies 43, no. 3 (2012): pp. 429-451.
See Greg Johnson, White Identity Politics, (San Francisco: Counter-Currents Publishing, 2020).
George Ruska, “Understanding Churchill’s America,” Pimlico Journal, (26 Aug, 2026). https://www.pimlicojournal.co.uk/p/understanding-churchills-americanism.
Neville Meaney, ‘“In History’s Page”: Identity and Myth’, in Australia’s Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 372.
Ibid, p. 374.
Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography’, Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (2001): p. 85.
Meaney, ‘The Problem of Nationalism and Transnationalism in Australian History: A Reply to Marilyn Lake and Christopher Waters’, History Australia 12, no. 2 (2015): p. 224.
Meaney, ‘“In History’s Page”: Identity and Myth’, pp. 376-377.
Meaney, ‘The Problem of Nationalism and Transnationalism in Australian History: A Reply to Marilyn Lake and Christopher Waters’, p. 229.
Stuart Ward, ‘Security: Defending Australia’s Empire’, p. 243.
John Hirst, The Sentimental Nation: The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 243.
Hirst, ‘Empire, State, Nation’, in Australia’s Empire pp. 140-162, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 159.
Meaney, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy: History and Myth’, Australian Outlook 23, no. 2 (1969): p. 175.
Ward, ‘Security: Defending Australia’s Empire’, p. 243.
Ibid., 240-241.
Meaney, ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy: History and Myth’, p. 176.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., pp. 178-179.
Meaney, ‘Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming of the Cold War’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 38, no. 3 (1992): p. 319.
Ibid., p. 320.
Ibid., p. 324.
John Singleton and Paul L. Robertson, Economic Relations Between Britain and Australasia 1945-1970, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 112.
John McEwen, John McEwen: His Story, (Canberra: The Nationals, 2013), p. 49.
Singleton and Robertson, Economic Relations Between Britain and Australasia, p. 114.
Ibid., p. 121.
Ibid., p. 125.
For an exploration of the end of the Sterling Area see Alan de Bromhead et al., ‘Sterling’s Farewell Symphony: The end of the Sterling Area revisited’, The Economic History Review 76, no. 2 (2023): pp. 415-444.
Singleton and Robertson, Economic Relations Between Britain and Australasia, p. 142.
Ibid, 145.
Ibid., p. 153.
Ibid., p. 154.
Ibid., p. 165.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 172.
Ibid., p. 196.
Ibid., p. 179.
Ibid., p. 218.
Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward, ‘Epilogue: After Empire’, in Australia’s Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 392.
Eric Richards, ‘Migrations: The Career of British White Australia’, in Australia’s Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 169.
Evan Smith, Andrekos Varnava, and Marinella Marmo, ‘The Interconnectedness of British and Australian Immigration Controls in the 20th Century: between Convergence and Divergence’, The International History Review 43, no. 6 (2021): p. 1364.
Ibid., p. 1365.
Richards, ‘Migrations: The Career of British White Australia’, p. 173.
Jayne Persian, ‘“Chifley liked them Blond”: DP Immigrants for Australia’, History Australia 12, no. 2 (2015): p. 84.
Neville Meaney proposes an even earlier timeline than I have, drawing a throughline from the ‘Yellow Peril’ rhetoric of the 1890s to ‘Populate or Perish’; see ‘The End of “White Australia” and Australia’s Changing Perception of Asia, 1945-1990’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no.2 (1995): p. 177.
‘Populate or Perish’, The Courier Mail, (24 Jan 1936), p. 12. https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/36790689.
Ibid.
Evan Smith, Andrekos Varnava, and Marinella Marmo, ‘The Interconnectedness of British and Australian Immigration Controls in the 20th Century: between Convergence and Divergence’, p. 1361.
Ibid., p. 1361.
Ibid.
Zachary Gorman, ‘To Discriminate or to Populate? Dismantling White Australia’, Robert Menzies Institute [Lecture], (2026). The quotes used in this presentation can be found in the non-digitised Menzies archives of the NAA.
National Archives of Australia, ‘Land of Opportunity: Australia’s post-war reconstruction (Research Guide)’, NAA (2015), 316. https://www.naa.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-06/research-guide-land-of-opportunity.pdf.
W.D. Forsyth, The Myth of Open Spaces, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1942).
John B. Condliffe, ‘[Review] The Myth of Open Spaces’, Geographical Review 33, no. 4 (1943): p. 691.
Ibid., 692.
Persian, ‘DP Immigrants for Australia’, p. 84.
Ibid., p. 85.
National Archives of Australia, ‘Land of Opportunity: Australia’s post-war reconstruction (Research Guide)’, p. 313.
Persian, ‘DP Immigrants for Australia’, p. 88.
For more on the changing conception of Whiteness in the US interwar period, see Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
Arthur Calwell, ‘Arthur Calwell Part 2 (In their own words)’, National Portrait Gallery, (1967) [Audio]. https://www.portrait.gov.au/words/arthur-calwell-part-two.
Neville Kirk, ‘Traditionalists and Progressives: Labor, Race and Immigration in Post-World War II Australia and Britain’, Australian Historical Studies 39, no. 1 (2008): p. 54.
Without questioning the veracity of his evidence, Brenton Sanderson’s case for Jewish responsibility for the dissolution of the White Australia Policy (see ‘The War on White Australia’ series in The Occidental Observer) is shortsighted and ignores factors of greater weight, such as External Affairs’ capitulation to growing international pressure and progressive forces in 1960s Australia that are not reducible to ‘Jewish influence’. The claim that there would have remained a White Australia Policy, if not for Calwell’s acceptance of a small number of Jews, is inadmissible.
John Thermidor, in his piece February Pimlico piece ‘The Fabian Society: a wolf in sheep’s clothing?’, deals at length with the myth-driven hysteria about Fabianism. https://www.pimlicojournal.co.uk/p/the-fabian-society-a-wolf-in-sheeps.
For full treatment of the British intake of Jews in this period, see Louise London, Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Andrew Markus and Suzanne Rutland, ‘Controlling Australian Immigration: Holocaust Survivors in the Post-War Years’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 70, no. 3 (2024): 554.
Ibid., pp. 552-553.
Persian, ‘DP Immigrants for Australia’, p. 90.
Markus and Rutland, ‘Controlling Australian Immigration’, p. 555.
Ibid., p. 553; Persian, ‘DP Immigrants for Australia’, p. 96.
Persian, ‘DP Immigrants for Australia’, pp. 97-98.
Ibid., pp. 95-96.
Kirk, ‘Traditionalists and Progressives’, p. 67.
Meaney, ‘The End of “White Australia” and Australia’s Changing Perception of Asia, 1945-1990’, p. 178.
Evan Smith and Andrekos Varnava, ‘Transnational Whiteness and the Elite Backlash to Reforming the Australian Immigration Control System in the 1950s and 1960s’, The Historical Journal 69 (2026): p. 456.
Kirk, ‘Traditionalists and Progressives’, p. 64.
Arthur Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, (Melbourne: Lloyd O’Neil & Rigby, 1972), p. 119.
Ibid., p. 117.
Ibid., p. 118.
Smith and Varnava, ‘Transnational Whiteness’, p. 1367.
Richards, ‘Migrations: The Career of British White Australia’, pp. 177-78.
