Good Afternoon,
As the Makerfield by-election rumbles on and early polling starts to emerge, it is becoming clear that, whilst margins are tight and everything is still all to play for, the current average expected outcome, from the limited evidence we have, is a slim Burnham victory resulting from Restore Britain securing 5-10% of the vote. So far, Reform’s attempts to win back these voters and counter Restore’s influence have not been effective.
The simple fact is that there is only one party which can, at the next election, win a majority in Parliament, destroying both establishment parties in the process, implement mass deportations and begin to fix the various crises that have riven the British state for decades — and that party is Reform. The biggest threats to this outcome are a Burnham-led Labour party which reconsolidates the left wing vote, and the possibility that Rupert Lowe might take 5% of the national vote, making a coalition with the Tories inevitable. The way to prevent both of these things is to effectively contain Restore now, win the by-election in Makerfield, and maintain momentum until the next general election. Getting this right matters.
Today, we will discuss how Reform can effectively campaign against Restore — what to say, what not to say, and how to say it.
Splitting the vote
On Saturday, the first poll of the Makerfield by-election was released by Survation. Constituency polls are always unreliable, and this one will likely prove the same, but the overall impression is approximately what one would expect given the national positions of Labour, Reform, and Restore, the dynamics of the constituency itself, and the personal popularity of Andy Burnham.
This produced a predictable response from Reform HQ and from leading Reform figures, who took the obvious opportunity to highlight the impact of splitting the vote.
The impulse to make these arguments is entirely understandable; people do vote tactically (especially in by-elections), and it is necessary to ensure that the electorate is aware of the real dynamics at play in the constituency as Restore’s deluded social media army attempt to confuse the picture. That said, this argument alone will not prove any more effective for Reform today than it was for the Conservatives in 2024. In fact, in the medium term it will prove counterproductive, because it reinforces the very narrative that Restore are trying to establish by implicitly conceding that voters might prefer Restore, but should vote for Reform simply because they have a better chance of winning. This in turn makes voters feel that the act of voting Reform is analogous to the act of voting for the Conservatives — a necessary compromise, rather than the real thing.
It is also important to note that the vast majority of Restore voters do not have a mental model of the Labour Party and its factions, and do not consider Burnham as meaningfully different to Keir Starmer. Based on crosstab polling by 2024 votes and current voting intentions of Burnham’s popularity, most in fact prefer him to the Prime Minister. They are not politically sophisticated, and they do not consider the way in which an (albeit likely temporary) shift in momentum towards a newly-crowned PM Burnham could threaten the prospects for any kind of right wing victory in 2029. The worst thing you could say to this voter is ‘Vote Restore, Get Burnham’. They don’t care about getting Burnham — for them, the Labour Party is a monolith, and after the grooming gangs scandal they view it as unelectable. They are therefore more worried about internecine battles on the right than fighting the left.
How can Reform successfully make the case for keeping the right united under their banner without suffering these downsides? Thankfully, there is a way to walk this tightrope: any argument about splitting the vote should be explicitly combined with a restatement of what is on the table to be lost if Reform does not win in 2029. A vote against Reform is a vote against mass deportations, against closing the borders, against slashing the welfare bill, and against tearing down the establishment. Every time you remind voters of the importance of voting tactically, you must remind them of what it is they will receive for doing so. You must make clear not just that you are the best viable option, but that you are offering a platform they should be excited about. The question that Restore supporters are asking is why they should bother caring about Reform’s victories: that is the question you must answer.
Fighting on the issues
Nigel Farage has, historically, largely ignored other figures competing for leadership of the right. Where he has engaged, such as with the BNP during the late 2010s, he has largely relied upon presenting himself as the sensible choice — an easy thing to do when your opponents are thinly-veiled (or out-and-out) national socialists. Whilst this approach has been successful in the past, it is not going to work for Restore, a party which is now rampant across social media, supported by the richest man in the world and led by a sitting MP.
The upside is that Reform does not need to be worried about fighting Restore directly on the issues themselves, because Nigel Farage, Zia Yusuf, and even Robert Jenrick are to the right of Rupert Lowe on immigration, which is basically the only issue relevant to the competition between the two parties. This is already reflected in Reform policy. The crucial point here is that, because of this, fighting Restore on the issues does not necessitate a spiral rightwards which would alienate other voters Reform needs to secure. The level of radicalism in existing party policy is sufficient to win this fight.
Two things are necessary to make this pitch effectively. The first is a unified summary of Reform’s immigration proposals, which currently exist over numerous policy announcements, papers, public statements and web pages. Whilst essentially all of the pieces are in place, this makes it harder for less engaged voters to get a clear overall picture of the full impact of Reform’s policies. A single document which restates the party’s commitment to deporting all illegal immigrants within five years, abolishing ILR, and refusing visa renewal for every foreign national who is not a net contributor (including criminals and those in social housing), with a clear summary of what this means in terms of the number of people that would leave the country, would make it far easier for voters to understand Reform’s full ambitions. This could then be turned into five minute social media videos by both Farage and Yusuf essentially reading the bullet-points, and could be announced as Reform’s immigration plans to great media fanfare. It should not take more than two days to get this out, including an hour or two for a press conference.
Secondly, Reform needs to establish some message discipline on these policies. The perception that different figures within the party are giving different accounts of immigration policy is directly contributing to the lack of trust among Restore voters that the party will deliver on its promises. It is particularly unhelpful when leading figures reinforce this perception as they jockey for influence within the party.
If policy is not clear enough to ensure that members of the Reform front bench are reading off of the same hymn sheet, how can distrustful voters be expected to take it seriously?
On the other hand, one can still see attempts by certain figures within the party to paint Reform in a far more moderate light. Laila Cunningham is perhaps the most notable example here — on several occasions, the prospective candidate for London Mayor has directly contradicted party policy, most recently on a live panel hosted by Politics UK. Cunningham is understandably attempting to appeal to a London electorate that is very different to the broader Reform base — but the reality is that no party can be everything to all people, and Reform especially as an unestablished force cannot reach out in all directions at once. Cunningham has no real chance of winning the race for Mayor, and having her attempt to do so in this way can only harm Reform in places they could win (as it appears to have done in East and Southeast London, where the party underperformed in the local elections just a few weeks ago). Cunningham has strengths as a candidate, and these issues could easily be fixed simply by providing some clear lines on these topics which must be stuck to.
Neither of these moves requires a change in policy — they simply ensure that voters (and Reform politicians) can clearly understand what the party intends to do in government and why they should be voting for them. By doing this, the need to attack Restore directly will be massively reduced. This approach therefore balances the need to appeal to Restore voters with the desire to avoid raising Restore’s salience and name recognition, which is still appropriate even as it becomes more difficult to achieve.
The appointment of Zia Yusuf to the Home Office brief has brought back some of Reform’s zeal for pushing the boat on immigration, much to our delight — and, if recent polling is to be taken as an indicator, to the delight of the electorate. A Ming vase strategy cannot work when the next election is so far away, and there is so much time for voters to become bored of Reform before they have the chance to get into government. More importantly, you cannot ask voters to believe that their lives will change for the better under your government unless you tell them, loudly, often, and consistently, how you are going to change the country. If the people demand change, you must tell them the change you are going to give. Whilst there is risk in nailing your colours to a flag, an excess of caution is the riskiest possible path in the current political environment. This kind of campaigning is Nigel Farage’s greatest strength, and nobody does it better than him. Time to go back to basics.
Positioning the party
As we have already covered, Restore’s party policy is to to the left of Reform’s, and Lowe is to the left of Farage. Restore is therefore not a challenger to the right — it is a union of cranks and grifters motivated by petty grievances against Farage for being ignored, expelled, or denied jobs in the party apparatus. That said, their voters absolutely do perceive it as a challenger to the right, wanting it to be so, and there is a constant chorus of social media influencers reinforcing that understanding.
Fighting on the issues will help to alleviate this pressure, but there’s no point fixing a leak if the tap is still turned on. Restore do not need to make this argument if Reform is out there making it for them. What is done is done, and past statements cannot be retracted, but from this moment there should be a complete ban on any Reform figure attempting to paint Restore as ‘scary evil fascists’ or otherwise extremists. Their voters do not care about this — they have been through a decade of social media influencers reinforcing the idea that these attacks are only ever deployed in bad faith, and that in fact being hit by them suggests you are right over the target.
The line is simple: Restore are cranks and weirdos who want to destroy Reform for personal reasons, making them the biggest obstacle to achieving mass deportations. They’re not extremists, they’re just weirdos. If you feel the need to attack them on their positions, a vague reference to their obsession with establishing Catholic theocracy will be far more off-putting than the suggestion that they want to ‘deport whole communities’, which, whilst absolutely not something that a sufficient plurality of the country would support, is absolutely something that Restore’s own voters are entirely comfortable with and eager for. In fact, one could do far worse than suggesting that Restore are the party for people who care more about restricting abortion than mass deportations. Above all, do not allow yourself to reinforce the narrative that Restore is a more radical party than Reform — that is precisely what their voters are asking them to be.
A note on Makerfield
The above advice is general purpose, although it should certainly be adopted as soon as possible and will help greatly in the upcoming by-election. That said, it is worth discussing the dynamics of that contest specifically. In all the concern over Restore, it is easy to lose sight of the main opponent in Makerfield, which is of course Andy Burnham. Winning back Restore voters is important, but winning back Reform voters who intend to lend personal support to Burnham is twice as valuable under first past the post, given that it also reduces your primary opponent’s support.
Happily, the two goals do not conflict. Campaigning heavily against Burnham on immigration, Europe, and his historical support for left wing causes such as transgenderism (much as we may not regard that as an issue of central importance) will do just as much to reinforce Reform’s credentials with Restore voters. ‘Vote Reform to stop Open Borders Burnham, show your support for our mass deportations plan, and stick two fingers up to the establishment once again as you did with Nigel Farage in 2016’ is not only the strongest argument against Burnham, but also against Restore. Yusuf’s campaign video from earlier in the week makes this argument perfectly.
The other crucial issue to hit is the grooming gangs. This is one of Burnham’s core weaknesses — as Mayor of Greater Manchester, he has consistently undermined efforts to investigate the phenomenon, and like almost every Labour politician of his day he is complicit in the coverup of what is undoubtedly the greatest evil to occur in this country for centuries. This is especially important given that Restore intend to release the findings of their farcical ‘grooming gangs report’ during the campaign — pre-empting them by taking ownership of this issue now will be incredibly valuable. There is a ‘350 million a week for the NHS’ angle to this argument as well — Burnham will deny these accusations, but any conversation connecting him to the topic will be to his detriment.
As for campaigning against Restore itself, it has already become clear — including to various prominent Restore surrogates — that Rebecca Shepherd is not only a weak candidate, but less solidly right wing than Kenyon. It would be prudent to avoid direct attacks on her that come across as mean, but it should be possible to get this across clearly. Proposing a debate between the two, managed correctly, would possibly be of great value — even if, as is likely, Restore refuse the offer.
Delete your social media!
There are numerous free web apps that delete a person’s entire history on various social media platforms in minutes. Whilst it has been heartening to see Reform stick by Robert Kenyon as the establishment media attempts to tear him down over comments made as a private citizen, and whilst in this case it seems unlikely that it will make a big difference, this could all have been avoided by simply using those tools. There is no good reason not to force all candidates to do so before they are announced. Of course, it may be that Kenyon’s posts were archived after he stood in 2024 — but the point still stands for future candidates. Nobody knows what they posted a decade ago, when nobody was watching. Best to play it safe.
Summary and prospects
Restore’s prospects are limited. Their potential support base is likely in the single figures nationally. But if they achieve more than 3% of the vote at a general election, the best outcome we can hope for is Reform as the largest party, supported in Parliament by the Conservatives. That would be a tremendous waste of the opportunity to sweep away the establishment and usher in a new chapter in our country’s history.
There are substantial divisions within Restore, which are likely to continue to cause problems for the party. Rupert Lowe is a Thatcherite who is interested in some level of immigration restriction and wants to run primarily on a platform of municipal conservatism. His core supporters — those who form the bulk of the party’s ground game — are ethnonationalists who generally favour some form of at least moderately anti-capitalist economic programme. The broader base is mostly Facebook boomers who would be deeply uncomfortable sharing a party with such people. Of course, Lowe’s own personal flaws, including what appears to be his declining mental faculties (shown quite remarkably in his recent Spectator interview with David Shipley) may also cause problems. The likelihood remains that these challenges will render the party less competitive over time.
Nevertheless, the tightness of current electoral margins and the uncertainty over how these factors will play out means that we cannot rely on Restore simply collapsing. Coasting to the next election will not be an option. The tools to fight are there — we must use them.
That’s all for today. Thanks for subscribing, and have a good rest of your week.
George Spencer Managing Editor, Pimlico Journal