Newsletter #65: Should Farage 'Unite the Right'?

PLUS: The Employment Rights Bill, and David Lammy's proposed changes to juries

Good morning.

This newsletter’s agenda: Should we ‘Unite the Right’? — Round 2 (free/paid); The Employment Rights Bill will do nothing to fix Britain’s labour market (paid); Can you still expect a ‘jury of your peers’ in modern Britain? (paid).

Should we ‘Unite the Right’? — Round 2

The last time that we discussed the potential for a Reform-Tory pact was back in March, when the proposition was floated by certain Conservatives — apparently backed by donors — wanting to ‘unite the right’. At the time, it was clearly an unserious proposition. Those involved seemed to naively assume that Reform would be eager for such a deal, not understanding that Farage held all the cards even then, with the Tories needing him far more than he needed them, or that a deal on which party would stand where would be impossible to reach. As I wrote at the time:

There is no real possibility of this kind of deal for the basic reason that Reform are currently primarily eating into the Tory vote in Tory areas. While it is true that their relative support over the Conservatives is probably highest in the North and Wales, their absolute support in many parts of the South (and in particular, Essex and Kent) is higher. And, for the most part, absolute support is what matters in winning seats.

Since then, aside from consistent moaning from Jacob-Rees-Mogg, we have heard very little more about a pact from anyone in either party.

That was until Round 2 began last week when the Financial Times reported that, at a meeting with donors, Farage claimed that he would be open to a pact with the Tories so long as Badenoch was not leader. The donors reportedly suggested that he had gone so far as to say that a pact was ‘inevitable’. Later the same day, Farage attacked the Financial Times and denied that there would be an agreement, but he did use the words ‘reverse takeover’ in his denial, sparking further speculation about defections. Soon after, there were reports that ‘senior figures’ in Reform wanted Jenrick to defect. Pointedly, Farage refused to comment on this. All of this, it should be noted, was happening in the context of a stalling momentum of Reform in the polls. Whether this was on Farage’s mind if he did indeed make these comments is hard to say.

It is clear that within Reform there are somewhat different opinions on whether more Tory defections are desirable, given the apparent incoherence of the party’s approach to this topic — compare, for instance, their often harsh rhetoric with their acceptance of clearly useless defectors like Nadine Dorries and Jake Berry.

At one extreme stands Zia Yusuf and those around him at Reform HQ. These people mostly refuse to socialise with anyone or anything Conservative, and also have very hostile relationship with the Tory-aligned media. Yusuf has even implied that right-wing Tory MPs like Jenrick and Braverman should be in prison for their role in the Afghan scandal, and responded with his now-characteristic vehemence once the Financial Times’ article was released. The relationship of this faction in headquarters with the party’s current Tory defectors (with the exception of Danny Kruger and Andrea Jenkyns) seems to be very negative, and they seem to be devoting a lot of energy to both blocking new defectors, and to discouraging future defectors by being so unpleasant to them so publicly and so often.

Their view is that the Conservative Party will end up tarnishing Reform’s brand by associating them with the last — disastrous — Tory Government. There is also a genuine desire to build something completely new rather than grafting the Reform project onto the old Tory one, as they worry will inevitably happen should there be too many defectors; a new project requires new people, they would argue. Labour have already started trying to use this line against Reform (though not to much effect). More cynically, they may also not want competition for senior positions in policymaking and, ultimately, in the Cabinet, as some Tory defectors seem bound to demand: Braverman, for instance, would surely want to become Reform’s Foreign Affairs spokesman; Jenrick would demand even more, and would quite obviously create a new power base within the party (even if we assume his complete loyalty to Farage, which is not a given). Tory factionalism could, in this argument, become Reform factionalism.

Others in Reform seem less hostile. Richard Tice is one example (though he seems to have relatively little hold over the main centres of power at Reform, and relations between him and Farage are reportedly strained). But probably more importantly, Farage’s old inner circle, largely composed of people who he has known since his UKIP days, plus some of those working in and around Parliament, seem more open. My understanding of what, exactly, these people think is weaker, but they seem to be rather less closed off to the mainstream media — and, probably tellingly, most of the information in the mainstream media about Reform seems to come from them, not HQ, which appears to be a tight ship. (The immediate assumption of a number of people I know to the reports was that the ‘source’ was Gawain Towler, though I should stress that I have no evidence for this either way.)

It is somewhat ironic that people who have dedicated much of their adult lives to opposing the Conservative Party are now taking this stance, but there we go. One explanation may be that this faction, despite their temporary victory over Yusuf when he resigned as Chairman, once again appear to be somewhat out of favour in Reform.

Ultimately, though, Nigel Farage is the ‘king’ in Reform. He has the final decision on the party’s approach to the Tories. He has his different courtiers, but a pluralistic organisation it is not. My view is that Farage’s own sentiments are closer to the ‘old guard’ group, though intellectually he probably acknowledges the strength of the view of the HQ group. One friend who spoke to Farage fairly recently recalled him claiming that the Tories could have bought him off with a peerage (I doubt that this is true, but it is somewhat remarkable that even at this late date he is making such a claim). I cannot see into Farage’s soul, but there is a touch of Ramsay MacDonald about him: he feels spurned by the establishment, but is still psychologically drawn to them in some way. He is also, fundamentally, just not that disagreeable of a person; again, very different to Yusuf and friends. Given this, it’s easy to see how undesirable defectors might end up making their way through despite the machinations of the HQ group. He is also worn down from being ‘Mister Racist’ for so much of his adult life, and may yearn for respectability more than the (often much younger) radicals and misanthropes in HQ — but perhaps British politics needs more radicalism and misanthropy. However, his evidently high respect for Yusuf seems to suggest that he knows, intellectually, that he must still hate the Tories.