Newsletter #55: Reform put legal migration back in the conversation

PLUS: Trump at the UN, Burnham in the New Statesman, and Starmer in 1984

Good morning,

Apologies for the recent scheduling disruptions. We have been hard at work getting ready for some big changes to come at Pimlico Journal, about which we will announce more on our second anniversary next week.

But lots to talk about this week, so let’s get to it.

This newsletter’s agenda: Legal migration is back in the conversation (free); Trump makes waves at the UN (paid); Burnham’s leadership campaign heats up (paid); Starmer goes all out on ID cards (paid).

Legal migration is back in the conversation

After a year in which illegal migration was the primary focus of political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, both Nigel Farage and Donald Trump came out this week with announcements on legal immigration, much to the relief of supporters concerned that this issue, which is ultimately of far greater importance, would continue to fall by the wayside.

At a press conference on Monday, Nigel Farage announced that a Reform Government would abolish Indefinite Leave to Remain completely, revoking permanent residency from those who currently hold it and refusing any future grants. Framed as a measure to avert the ‘Boriswave’ (a term which now seems destined to become common parlance), the policy represents a marked radicalisation for a party leader who only earlier this year touted his centrist credentials by predicting that a Jenrick-led Tory party would end up to the Right of Reform on immigration.

ILR is currently the sole form of non-citizen permanent residency in the UK, and is available to most immigrants on work or family visas after five years (although the government has announced as-yet unimplemented plans to extend this to ten years). It is also the primary route for most immigrants to receive British citizenship, as citizenship can typically be applied for twelve months after an ILR grant. Abolishing ILR therefore requires rewriting much of the existing immigration and naturalisation process, and whilst some of these plans were laid out in a policy document released following the press conference, some aspects remain unclear.

Reform committed to replacing the existing work visa/ILR system with a 5-year renewable work visa, subject to significantly higher salary thresholds, although the specific benchmarks were left to be decided based on ‘net fiscal modelling’ closer to the general election. Seemingly no longer content to be outflanked by future competitors, this suggests Farage is looking to keep his options open on just how hard a line to take here — a particularly good sign, as it shows the Reform leader is aware that public opinion on immigration is radicalising, and that this is a wave he will have to ride rather than attempt to hold back. This visa will also have additional income thresholds for bringing dependents, will require higher standards of English, and impose stricter rules on what constitutes ‘good character’.

Whilst these rule changes may reduce numbers, any system which provides access to UK visas on the basis of universal eligibility criteria will encounter the same fundamental challenge encountered by Theresa May as Home Secretary: that the Government has no direct control over how many people enter the country in a given period of time, instead only being able to adjust the flow indirectly by meddling with the rules. Whilst Reform have previously discussed capping immigration, no explicit cap is included in the policy document, nor was one mentioned in the press conference. Such a measure will be necessary to ensure that this policy achieves its goals. Once a cap is introduced, the method of rationing will also be important. As this journal has argued before, the best approach here would be a visa auction with supply capped, ideally tied to the exit of those who are deported having failed to meet the new stricter criteria. If Reform is to succeed in achieving net emigration, they must tie grants of entry to exits in this manner or similar.

Additionally, a temporary ‘Acute Skills Shortage Visa’ will be issued in limited and capped numbers, with a levy directly tied to the training of a British replacement for the visa holder. Whilst this may draw some criticism given past experience with outwardly similar schemes, the devil is in the details. If such workers have the ability to transition onto other visas or to work towards citizenship, it will undoubtedly become subject to the same flaws as the current ‘points-based’ system. Equally, if businesses are allowed to demand the issuance of visas to avoid increased labour costs, we will see the same abuses. On the other hand, if it is genuinely used in critical situations based on the government’s economic assessment of necessity, it may provide useful flexibility.

A key emphasis of Reform’s announcements was the removal of all access to welfare and public funds for all non-citizens, regardless of visa type. Whilst most visas currently offer ‘no recourse to public funds’, this provision can easily be sidestepped by court order on a number of bases, including the risk of ‘imminent destitution’. Given that welfare is — at least in theory — given only to those in precisely those circumstances in the first place, this provision is currently almost entirely redundant. One important question here which was not addressed is the standing of non-citizen occupants of social housing under these plans, and given Farage’s NIMBYism and reliance on reducing migration to mitigate the housing crisis, it will be necessary to address this particularly egregious issue if he has any hope of doing so.

What was left most unclear was the future of naturalisation under this new immigration framework. Whilst Farage declared that he would increase the residency requirements to seven years from five, he did not provide any clarity on the other criteria that Reform will place on eligibility for citizenship. In most cases, immigrants must have ILR to apply for naturalisation under the current rules. If the new renewable work visa will simply take the place of ILR here, it won’t have to be renewed for long before immigrants will be able to take up citizenship. Beyond the necessity for more clarity on how the system will work, it is important that Reform offers a position on naturalisation based on an understanding of what it means to be a British Citizen that goes beyond having lived in the country for less than two parliaments. Indeed, as has been demonstrated in the scare stories of left-wing commentators deployed in reaction to Reform’s announcements, there are many immigrants who currently choose not to go through the process of naturalisation having received ILR. If citizenship remains the default outcome of remaining in Britain for a certain length of time, this move may actually prompt many to take up citizenship who otherwise might not have — and almost none of those people will be voting for Reform, or indeed any other right-of-center party.

Indeed, if this policy is designed to prevent the Boriswave from obtaining permanent residency, it may in fact not be enough to commit to revoking ILR from those already with it. The earliest arrivals of that cohort will become eligible for ILR in 2026, and for citizenship in 2027. Those who arrived in the peak years of 2022 and 2023 will be eligible for citizenship in 2028 and 2029 respectively, assuming that the Government continues to drag its feet on extending the timeline for ILR, largely in fear of another backbench rebellion. As much as Farage would argue otherwise, given current polling it is vanishingly unlikely that the next election occurs much before July 2029, and by that point, it may be too late to avert Boris Johnson’s great betrayal without touching existing citizenships — the one remaining third rail in the immigration debate.

Whilst all these questions will have to be addressed in the coming months and years, it has to be said that this announcement demonstrates a seriousness on the issue of migration which Reform had not, until now, demonstrated. Fears from earlier this year that a Reform government would cave on immigration are to a large extent no longer justified. What remains to be seen is whether they will work out the details in a way which affords them success.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Trump administration also made moves on visa reform this week. Whilst the announcement can only be described as shambolic, the resulting policy remained strong — although not as strong as Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s comments from the Oval Office may have initially led us to believe. What was initially described as a $100,000 annual fee for all successful H1-B applicants was later clarified to be a one-time fee, and whilst it was suggested that this would apply retroactively to all current H1-B holders, it will in fact only apply to new applicants from the next lottery in February 2026.

Whilst procedural correctness is often levied as a criticism by the worst smug ‘sensibles’ at their inevitably less-experienced challengers, the administration’s disorganisation is becoming a genuine detriment to Trump’s reputation and, being a completely avoidable mistake, is something they deserve criticism for. It does not seem too much to ask that cabinet members receive a five-minute briefing before a press conference to ensure they know the basic details of the policy that they are meant to be announcing.

Trump makes waves at the UN

Later in the week, Trump caused outrage among all the usual suspects with a speech to the UN general assembly in which he levelled various attacks against that organisation and member states, allies and enemies alike. He condemned the UN’s climate activism, as well as their support for illegal migrants to the US and elsewhere, and offered the same routine on Europe’s migration crisis that we have grown used to hearing over the past nine months, including a riff on ‘Sharia Law’ which supposedly imposes itself now on various parts of the UK in particular.