Newsletter #37: Sir Keir Stormer?

PLUS: Does Britain need a bit more 'America'?

Good morning.

Apologies for the late newsletter: we were rushing to get out our ‘Social Housing Phenomenon, part 2’ article, since we received intelligence that hostile forces were looking to beat us to it (as we’ve sat on the data for months, but hadn’t gotten around to getting it into a publishable format). Today, we examine Sir Keir Stormer’s immigration agenda; the Farage-Lowe feud; and consider whether Britain needs a bit more ‘America’.

This newsletter’s agenda: Sir Keir Stormer? A look at the new Migration White Paper (free); Does Britain need a bit more ‘America’? (paid); Farage-Lowe feud reaches partial closure (paid).

Sir Keir Stormer? A look at the new Migration White Paper

‘Sir Enoch Starmer’ was my moniker for him after Starmer’s now-infamous ‘island of strangers’ speech. But I later heard ‘Sir Keir Stormer’, and think that this is much better. But, more pertinently, is there any fire (or, I suppose, lightening) behind Starmer’s new Migration White Paper, or is it all just smoke (or thunder)? Are you just having your strings pulled by the Irishman, as J’accuse alleges? Let’s investigate.

I am instead actually going to read the White Paper, listing not the rhetoric or the argument, but all of the proposed policy changes (and my own thoughts on them). It’s not that I don’t think rhetoric matters: even where it is being engage in somewhat dishonestly, it can still intellectually frame matters. However, it is still also important to not get lost.

I will then give my own conclusions on the White Paper; once again, based on policy, not rhetoric.

Chapter 2, ‘Migration, Labour Market and Growth’

• Establish a ‘Labour Market Evidence Group’. This, in effect, is a talking shop between various government organisations which is intended to ‘gather data’ on ‘skills’, especially as they pertain to demands for immigration. This will then be used to create a ‘workforce strategy… which employers will be expected to comply with’. While more data and discussion is always welcome, this is unlikely to achieve much, and without any clear mechanisms, any ‘workforce strategies’ will be impotent — a problem that has plagued proposed micro-level labour market interventions for literally decades. Probably a cosmetic change, but one that I think is actually intended to achieve something. The best possible outcome is that this is used as an excuse to constantly say ‘no’, but I doubt this is what will happen.

• Increase the threshold for ‘Skilled Workers’ from RQF 3, the equivalent of A Levels, to RQF 6, the equivalent of an undergraduate degree. This is in line with pre-2020 policy. Additionally, salary thresholds will be increased; and the ‘eligible occupations’ list will be cleaned up, removing 180 categories. However, immigrants on ‘Skilled Worker’ visas already will be grandfathered in, and able to renew their visas even if they don’t meet the new requirements. These are certainly good changes, but are merely restoring the system to the (already broken) one before Boris Johnson destroyed the country completely. Nor will any attempt be made to undo bad decisions in the past.

• Only in cases where ‘…the [Migration Advisory Committee] has advised it is justified, where there is a workforce strategy in place, and where employers seeking to recruit from abroad are committed to playing their part in increasing recruitment from the domestic workforce’ will it be possible to add an occupation to the ‘temporary shortage list’, which has lower requirements. Additionally, ‘…sectors will only be potentially added to the Temporary Shortage list if they are key to the industrial strategy or delivering critical infrastructure and following advice from the MAC.’ If all of these restrictions are actually implemented fully, this will basically make the ‘temporary shortage list’ no longer viable for employers to exploit, but that’s a big ‘if’. Nonetheless, I imagine it will still represent a substantial tightening of the rules.

• The Adult Social Care visa has finally been abolished. An excellent decision, and one that was long overdue; this will make some actual difference to net migration.

• Refugees, ‘where they have the skills to do so’, will be able to apply for existing sponsored worker routes. Whether this is merely cosmetic, i.e., added to placate angry backbenchers, or a terrible change is as of yet unclear.

• The ‘Immigration Skills Charge’, effectively a surcharge on certain visas, has been increased in line with inflation. This is of no real importance.

• The number of ‘Global Talent’ visas will be increased. I am sceptical of this, as very few ‘talent’ programmes remain truly selective; moreover, even if it does, it may well prove to be yet another way of undercutting British graduates in an already tough labour market. A sop to the few remaining immigration fanatics in Britain, but not an especially harmful one.

Chapter 3, ‘Skilled Students’

• Introduce a levy on international student fee income, to be ‘reinvested in higher education and skills’. No information was given on this levy’s size, but given the financial fragility of the sector, it is almost bound to be small. Probably a cosmetic change.

• Various efforts will be made to strengthen anti-fraud mechanisms on student visas. This is likely of rather little significance, and it is unlikely that sanctions will be severe on those institutions that fail. It will, however, prompt some minor changes in the behaviour of universities. Additionally, those institutions that wish to recruit more students must prove they have the capacity for this, and to consider the effect on the local area; once again, this is a cosmetic change.

• Further scrutiny on visas for those who want to study English will also be imposed. This is a useful change, but of marginal importance. Already, this specific visa (which only has 4,200 applications per year) had very high rates of rejection, and this will increase further.

• The graduate work visa will be reduced from two years to eighteen months. Undeniably a good thing, but hardly radical. This will only make a small difference to demand for the ‘Deliveroo graduate visa’.

Chapter 4, ‘Fair Controls’

• A ‘new family policy’ will be set out by the end of this year, so as to make more decisions under a clear, established framework rather than under an exceptional one. No further comments are possible until we have a picture of what this will look like. We do, however, know that it will seek to prevent people from staying here under Article 8 in cases where they obtained a visa under false pretences.

• Meanwhile, a stronger ‘public interest test’ will be imposed, making it (supposedly) easier to deport those who have committed crimes while on a short-term visa. I imagine the courts will find a way to frustrate this.

• A ‘Windrush Commissioner’ will be appointed, acting as a ‘trusted independent advocate for the Windrush Community’. Meanwhile, ‘…both the findings of the Windrush Lessons Learned Review, and the Equality and Human Rights Commission Action Plan will be embedded within the Home Office to make sure equality and ethical standards are at the forefront of all departmental decisions.’ Err… where is Sir Keir Stormer again?

• In order to prevent ‘exploitation’, as occurred at ‘unprecedented’ levels under Social Care visas, it will become easier for immigrants to work for different employers. I worry that this will (somehow) make enforcement harder, if only marginally. The ‘domestic worker’ route will also be ‘reconsidered’, due to high rates of abuse — something that is good, but of no real significance.

• ‘We… will strengthen the protections in place to support [domestic abuse victims] to take action against their abusers, without fear of repercussion on their immigration status.’ It goes without saying that provisions will soon be abused by those who have no right to be here. Unscrupulous lawyers love this sort of stuff.

Chapter 5, ‘Rules Respected and Enforced’

• There will be a ‘Border Security Command’ with ‘new counter terrorism style powers’. Nothing much can be said at this stage.

• New digital systems for tracking overseas nationals will be introduced, with the aim of being able to easily tell whether someone has overstayed their visa, and whether they are in or out of the country. Not much can be said about this, as it all depends on the effectiveness of implementation, but outwardly, a useful but minor change.

• Visa-free travel will be reimposed on countries where people tend to come here to claim asylum, as has already occurred in mid-2024 for Jordan and Colombia. A minor change that raises the question of why these places were even allowed to visa-free travel in the first place.

• Measures will be ‘explored’ to deal with the problem of those on valid visas suddenly claiming asylum, such as new rules for people from countries which have not materially changed. Once again, it will be difficult to deal with the courts; however, I suspect that they will have some degree of success in this case. The question is whether anyone will actually get removed. Additionally, ‘scientific and technological methods’ for verifying age will be explored — a useful change.

• Tougher penalties will be imposed on those who employ illegal immigrants, as well as for non-bank financial institutions that facilitate the financial dealings of illegal immigrants. Useful.

• The definition of ‘serious crime’ will be broadened, now including any offence that could get someone placed on the Sex Offenders Register, meaning that these people no longer have the right to claim asylum protections here. There are plans to further broaden the scope of ‘serious crime’ later this year, including for non-custodial sentences. A good change, but very likely not strong enough.

Chapter 6: Fostering Integration and Cohesion

• Language requirements on visas will be somewhat increased, including for adult dependents. This will probably have relatively little effect, though might discourage the worst of the worst.

• The standard qualifying period for settlement will be increased from five to ten years. Although not mentioned in the White Paper, it now seems clear that this change is intended to apply to current immigrants as well. This is an enormously important change, though only because it gives us some time to refuse to roll over visas and remove undesirable immigrants. It is unlikely that Keir Starmer will do any of this.

• It will be easier for ‘children who have been in the UK for some time’ to regularise their status and settle. Financial barriers to citizenship for young adults who have lived here since childhood will also be reduced. Of marginal significance.

• Citizenship will also become harder to obtain, though details are currently scant.

So what does this all amount to? On the whole, this is a list of minor changes that are to be welcomed, but are not going to transform anything; some welcome tinkering around the edges, some tidying up that would be good if we already had a decent system, but is completely insufficient for the scale of the problem.

Many other aspects are difficult to say much on until we know more about what they will look like; others depend on implementation; still others depend on the courts. While this is still a policy pivot from the last fifteen years or more of Labour, it does not match their rhetoric.

There are a few exceptions, however, which will have an immediate and more definite impact. Most obviously, the changes to ILR — but also the abolition of the Social Care Visa, and the restoration of the pre-Boris Skilled Worker Visa. Yet the problem is that Britain needs to not just move things back to the better, but still hardly ‘good’ pre-Boris system: it needs to undo some of the immigration decisions made over the last few year by refusing to roll over visas. There is absolutely zero chance that this path will ever be pursued by Keir Starmer. As such, the complacency of some on the Online Right is not at all justified.