Hello! An Emirati here! Thanks for the excellent article.
A few observations:
1) Britain still carries considerable goodwill and reservoirs of soft power in the Gulf. Its imperial presence in the region was comparatively more benevolent than in other parts of the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, where it was at times problematic (I’m not attacking the British Empire, but you know what I mean).
2) In fact, the close relationship between Britain (and later the U.S.) and the Gulf was a significant reason why GCC states and ruling families were often targeted by the Arab left, global anti-colonial movements, various strands of political Islam, American academia, and even the Guardian, you name it!
3) Because the relationship between Britain and the Gulf is deep and multi-layered, the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood — and political Islam more broadly — is highly sensitive. political Islam is regarded as an ontological threat to the developmental model that the UAE, in particular, seeks to propagate across the region.
4) The UAE is an authoritarian state — we know this — but:
i) There is a recognition that political liberalisation or democratic transition is fraught with immense danger, considering the region we inhabit. And the UAE has never claimed to be a robust democracy with a liberal ethos — unlike Singapore.
ii) There is a deep (and I think genuine) belief within the UAE that the country represents an Arab model that has avoided/transcended the catastrophic trajectory of many post-independence states in the region. This model rests on several pillars:
iii) A soft brand of secularism that is not hostile to religion but doesn’t allow it to dictate public policy, and which seeks — gradually — to diminish its influence within the political legitimacy equation. This includes encouraging a reformed version of Islam that is reconciled with modernity.
iv) A sharp focus on building a viable and prosperous post-oil economy; empowering women (roughly a third to half of the cabinet are women); and positioning the country as a regional and global leader in AI.
v) A foreign policy that combines calculated interventionism with a ruthless focus on safeguarding national interests, alongside a deep commitment to fighting Islamism wherever it emerges.
vi) In essence, confronting Islamism has become the singular ideological driver of UAE foreign policy — in some ways an Emirati version of the U.S.’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) — GWOPI, if you will.
I genuinely admire Mohammed bin Zayed’s (MbZ) courage in confronting political Islam, especially during that deeply uncertain moment of 2011, when the Arab Spring uprisings swept the region. What initially appeared to be a liberal dawn quickly morphed into chaos, which Islamist forces sought to exploit — at times with what many here perceived as tacit support from the Obama administration.
MbZ did not have to do this! He was — and remains — widely respected domestically and internationally, and his counsel and the hard-power capabilities under his command are in high demand. Yet he chose to face Islamism anyway — partly out of political calculation — but also because of what he believed, from his own experience, to be its destructive consequences. He did not want to see his country consumed by that force, and he was convinced that an alternative path or reality was necessary.
This is part of the logic behind his decision to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020.
Against that backdrop, Britain’s hesitant or lenient approach toward Islamism has been perceived here — like it or not — as something akin to a “stab in the back.”
A lot to comment on. First, I do not share your predilection for the little Gulf autocrats. Their 'nations' are really only disguised tribes with flags. That the former bedouins are filthy rich and prone to love the public school-fostered English snobbery strikes me as not commendable. And support for regimes like the kingdom of Bahrain, which oppresses the majority of its population, is also distasteful. Human rights issues are not quite as irrelevant as you pretend...I see your realpolitik matrix but I do not share it. Second, the idea that a Deform (sic) government would do well with the Gulfies for me is a good an argument against it. Anyway, Rupert Lowe will blow up the chances of Deform, I think. Lastly, I suspect Lawrence of Arabia if alive today would not care much for the Gulf rulers. Rather. he would support the Resistance! Cheers! 😇
Great article, wish I had written it
Hello! An Emirati here! Thanks for the excellent article.
A few observations:
1) Britain still carries considerable goodwill and reservoirs of soft power in the Gulf. Its imperial presence in the region was comparatively more benevolent than in other parts of the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, where it was at times problematic (I’m not attacking the British Empire, but you know what I mean).
2) In fact, the close relationship between Britain (and later the U.S.) and the Gulf was a significant reason why GCC states and ruling families were often targeted by the Arab left, global anti-colonial movements, various strands of political Islam, American academia, and even the Guardian, you name it!
3) Because the relationship between Britain and the Gulf is deep and multi-layered, the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood — and political Islam more broadly — is highly sensitive. political Islam is regarded as an ontological threat to the developmental model that the UAE, in particular, seeks to propagate across the region.
4) The UAE is an authoritarian state — we know this — but:
i) There is a recognition that political liberalisation or democratic transition is fraught with immense danger, considering the region we inhabit. And the UAE has never claimed to be a robust democracy with a liberal ethos — unlike Singapore.
ii) There is a deep (and I think genuine) belief within the UAE that the country represents an Arab model that has avoided/transcended the catastrophic trajectory of many post-independence states in the region. This model rests on several pillars:
iii) A soft brand of secularism that is not hostile to religion but doesn’t allow it to dictate public policy, and which seeks — gradually — to diminish its influence within the political legitimacy equation. This includes encouraging a reformed version of Islam that is reconciled with modernity.
iv) A sharp focus on building a viable and prosperous post-oil economy; empowering women (roughly a third to half of the cabinet are women); and positioning the country as a regional and global leader in AI.
v) A foreign policy that combines calculated interventionism with a ruthless focus on safeguarding national interests, alongside a deep commitment to fighting Islamism wherever it emerges.
vi) In essence, confronting Islamism has become the singular ideological driver of UAE foreign policy — in some ways an Emirati version of the U.S.’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) — GWOPI, if you will.
I genuinely admire Mohammed bin Zayed’s (MbZ) courage in confronting political Islam, especially during that deeply uncertain moment of 2011, when the Arab Spring uprisings swept the region. What initially appeared to be a liberal dawn quickly morphed into chaos, which Islamist forces sought to exploit — at times with what many here perceived as tacit support from the Obama administration.
MbZ did not have to do this! He was — and remains — widely respected domestically and internationally, and his counsel and the hard-power capabilities under his command are in high demand. Yet he chose to face Islamism anyway — partly out of political calculation — but also because of what he believed, from his own experience, to be its destructive consequences. He did not want to see his country consumed by that force, and he was convinced that an alternative path or reality was necessary.
This is part of the logic behind his decision to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020.
Against that backdrop, Britain’s hesitant or lenient approach toward Islamism has been perceived here — like it or not — as something akin to a “stab in the back.”
A lot to comment on. First, I do not share your predilection for the little Gulf autocrats. Their 'nations' are really only disguised tribes with flags. That the former bedouins are filthy rich and prone to love the public school-fostered English snobbery strikes me as not commendable. And support for regimes like the kingdom of Bahrain, which oppresses the majority of its population, is also distasteful. Human rights issues are not quite as irrelevant as you pretend...I see your realpolitik matrix but I do not share it. Second, the idea that a Deform (sic) government would do well with the Gulfies for me is a good an argument against it. Anyway, Rupert Lowe will blow up the chances of Deform, I think. Lastly, I suspect Lawrence of Arabia if alive today would not care much for the Gulf rulers. Rather. he would support the Resistance! Cheers! 😇
Most criticisms of Arab gulf states stem from jealousy of how successful and independent and debt free they are
Frank is an Islamo-leftist crank who sometimes comments here. He can be ignored.
Glad you gave me background so I know who I am talking to
Gulf states are hugely popular amongst non Islamist Arabs
Please call it Arab Gulf for starters