Britain and the future of European migration

Britain and its European future, part 2

Of the many disputes that characterised British politics during the era of Brexit, from sovereignty to the economy, perhaps the least well served by the endless circus of media interviews and parliamentary debates were the respective roles the EU and an independent Britain could play on the world stage. At most, we were confronted with trivial platitudes about how ‘Global Britain’ could strike out and form bountiful trade deals that would forge the future of prosperity or, conversely, how losing access to the single market would mean the dwindling of Britain’s economy and power. To those seeking to understand British politics both of these visions offer ample evidence of the insidious parochialism that is endemic to the British political class. And yet, this omission remains surprising given that Britain’s place in the world clearly lies at the very heart of the drive to exit the EU and the corresponding anxiousness to return.

Where issues of world affairs were largely neglected the same certainly cannot be said for the greatest issue facing Europe today: migration. As we all unpleasantly remember, Brexit promised to regain control of our borders, reduce migration, and ensure Whitehall accountability. That this has not yet occurred is hardly worth disputing. To the many on the Right who reflexively defend Brexit, this failure can be ascribed solely to the machinations of Boris Johnson and the idiotic, treasonous nature of the political class more broadly. While aspects of this interpretation might be wrong, we certainly agree that it is unfair to level the decisions of one government against the entire Brexit project. Yet we also maintain that Brexit will significantly impair attempts at a large-scale ‘remigration’, whether of the legally settled or illegal immigrants. Accordingly, in this article we will show that Britain’s efforts to resolve its migration problem and its ability to project power globally will be best served by returning as a leading member of a unified Europe.

To most right-wing proponents of Brexit this thesis will likely appear completely nonsensical. No doubt that, in their view, illegal migration can be quickly resolved via the multi-pronged strategy of leaving the ECHR, pursuing an aggressive pushback policy towards France, and swiftly deporting those already here. Meanwhile, as recent calls for ‘net-zero’ migration reveal, the attitude towards legal migration is of immediately reducing inflow while those already here will somehow be returned home, presumably once the necessary aircraft have been scheduled. As to whether their countries of origin might decline to accept returns, little thought is given. Perhaps some appeal is made to the Trump Administration and its recent use of economic sanctions, especially the withholding of remittances. We might add the additional suggestion of bilateral return agreements or, in essence, bribery.

For an independent Britain neither strategy will fully succeed. In the first instance, although we agree that leaving the ECHR would greatly alleviate the problem of illegal migration it is unlikely that it will completely eradicate this scourge. For one, the Human Rights Act only constrains government once migrants have already arrived in British territory and so repealing this law and undermining related legal judgements will do nothing to prevent the immediate flow of people, which is the main problem that we face. Moreover, several attempts have been made to clamp down on illegal migration going back at least to Blair, whose government passed several measures to restrict illegal migration though to no avail. (Indeed, the Blair government was so committed to reducing illegal — if not legal — entry that they even considered processing migrants on the Isle of Mull in the Inner Hebrides, a policy approach that still echoes today.) More recently, Cameron attempted to combine greater cooperation with the French with a ‘hostile environment’ policy at home but, however well intentioned, these efforts were half-hearted and had little effect. Still, it must be granted that the numbers of illegal migrants then were trivial in comparison to today and this is in large part because of Whitehall’s reluctance to meaningfully combat this issue.

Even if the British state undertook the actions discussed above, assuming that even moderate climate change predictions are accurate, we will soon be faced by a marked dislocation of the ever-burgeoning sub-Saharan population. One UN estimate has it that 700 million people could be displaced due to water stress by 2030 while the World Bank has found that there could be as many as 216 million climate migrants by 2050. As with many aspects of the climate agenda, these numbers must be treated with scepticism and it must be remembered that Europe will not be accessible to many of these people. Yet these figures still serve to indicate the sheer scale of the problem that could well face us in the near future. The inevitable result of this kind of displacement will be a substantial increase in the number of aspirant migrants who, without robust intervention, will reach the shores Lampedusa, and thereafter Europe, and eventually Britain. In order therefore to eliminate this problem, at least to the degree this is possible, we must stop this migration at its source.

Fear not: we are not suggesting that ‘climate justice for the third world’ is the correct course of action; rather, we believe that ensuring compliant regimes in North Africa and, where that fails, the robust defence of Europe’s borders, from the Mediterranean basin to Belarusian border, would be the best course of action. Our solution would require a coordinated pan-European force to patrol the sea, apprehend migrants, and discourage adversarial action by foreign states. Some of the required security architecture has already been put in place in the form of ‘Fortress Europe’ since the backlash from the European migrant crisis of 2015, but we must go further. We do not deny that this could be achieved through bilateral arrangements with the EU; indeed, we would support such a policy. But it must be recognised that the EU has considerably less incentive to accept such a deal than we ourselves, and provoking the French with the Royal Navy would hardly endear them to our interests. While European unity may not, therefore, be strictly necessary in combatting illegal migration, increased European cooperation will undoubtedly be essential in achieving significant gains in these matters and, needless to say, it would be better for Britain’s interests if it was a leader in this move to greater security cooperation.

As for repatriating settled migrants, this would require the consent of their respective countries of origin. Although in some cases these countries prove agreeable, the experience of the Trump administration with Colombia and Mexico shows this is highly unlikely to be a ubiquitous trend. It is far more likely that Britain would — much like the United States — be forced to enact economic counter-measures to ensure compliance with any move to remove these populations. But Britain simply does not have comparable economic power to the United States. As we have seen, the Trump Administration has tactically deployed remittances to ensure compliance with the return of illegal migrants to states like Mexico, but their annual payments amount to $103 billion (£78.3 billion). While Britain’s total of £9.3 billion is hardly insignificant, it may be insufficient to coerce foreign states. By contrast, although still far less than the US, the EU recorded €50.9 billion (£44.9 billion) in annual remittances. A similar story can be observed in terms of military exports and foreign aid, both of which are of immediate significance in securing compliance: although Britain is certainly of significance in both of these categories, spending around £15.3 billion on aid and exporting around £14.5 billion of military hardware, by comparison the EU and its member states amount to €95.9 billion (£84.3 billion) and €57.4 billion (£50.6 billion) respectively.

It is true that many of these potentially recalcitrant nations will be comparatively weak, thus making the prospect of bilateral agreements like those signed with Rwanda and Albania much more feasible. However, this approach is only realistically suited to relatively small — and often in some way criminal — populations as it is difficult to see how, in the current climate at least, foreign states could collaborate in wholesale population transfer. Equally, this simply will not work against states, like India, which are moderately powerful and have made clear their strategic investment in the current system of migration. No government in Britain could rightly take the immense risk of a Trump-style trade war.

Far better, we think, would be to effect a sea-change in the current international norms of citizenship, migration and the obligations of states — though for that, one requires power. As has become obvious to us all, power is something Britain sorely lacks. Not so for the EU: for all of Europe’s problems, while Europe may be equally underdeveloped, the EU put together remains the second-largest economy on earth and, under the right leadership, could be of great international importance. Accordingly, were Europe as a whole to move wholly and unequivocally towards immigration restrictionism, we believe this would have seismic and irreversible effects regarding the current international norms surrounding migration and asylum.

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In making these arguments we can already hear the inevitable chorus of execration. Many readers would no doubt insist that the EU is just as bad — if not worse — than Britain in its sycophantic approach to migration; that the various populist incursions will continue to fail to impress themselves on the EU; and that, with the inevitable victory of Reform, Britain — not Europe — will be enacting the ‘most ambitious programme of deportations in history’. On deportations, we are less optimistic about Reform than some (though more optimistic than many others). But, more to the point, we are not arguing that the present ruling ethos of Brussels is superior to Westminster; rather, we simply believe that the combined strength of Europe is better placed to respond to our present problems — a position which is entirely consistent with a drive to fundamentally change both Britain and the EU.

Even so, it is also worth pointing out that the EU has come a long way since 2015. In that era, David Cameron’s entirely sensible response to the migrant crisis and plucky hopes to reform free movement had been confronted by the deranged utopianism of Angela Merkel and the outright of hostility of the EU in defence of its sacrosanct ‘four freedoms.’ Today, by contrast, as Meloni’s recent spearheading of ECHR reform indicates, the increasing tendency in Europe is of finally challenging the migration orthodoxy that has prevailed since the beginning of the century.

In this respect especially, the EU is already one step ahead: it is not a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (notwithstanding its technical legal objection to accede), and is thus not subject to rulings by the ECHR. It is also for this reason that the EU has refrained from enforcing any judgements by the court upon member states. Admittedly, the Byzantine structure of the EU does render its reform considerably harder than the need to win a simple majority in Parliament, but even here there is cause for hope since the present state of affairs can only prevail so long as the Council remains under control of the centre.

As the success of parties like FdI, ANO, Smer, Fidesz, and PiS and the continued rise of parties like AfD, RN, FPÖ, and AUR indicate, a right-wing takeover of the Council could well be on the horizon. Of course, many of these populist parties leave much to be desired, especially on the economy (as Pimlico Journal has never tired of pointing out). But their success nevertheless demonstrates that it may soon no longer be legitimate to cast the EU as a villainous facilitator of migration, as was so roundly achieved in Britain in the campaign of 2016. On the contrary: if these parties are able to inaugurate a shift in perception and culture within the EU, an end more feasible than many realise, then this could well prove to be the catalyst for a pan-European, and ultimately civilisational, response to the problem of migration.

On their own, we think these problems give good reasons for seeking reintegration with a federal Europe, though they also betray a deeper problem: namely, the grave limitations of British power. To put the matter succinctly, if standing alone, Britain simply cannot project power globally. To think that Brexit will somehow enable Britain to reclaim its past glories is nothing short of delusional. Far closer to the truth is that — much as certain Remainers argued — outside of the EU, Britain risks becoming completely irrelevant in global affairs. This is at a time where the end of undisputed American hegemony is likely to foster much less forgiving international conditions. That this is broadly true follows from even the most cursory analysis of the present state of world affairs: Britain clearly cannot match the US, China, or even Russia in either hard or soft power terms, while we also lag behind these countries in the especially salient factors of growth, technological innovation, and military force. While it is true that Britain still has certain advantages — for instance, it maintains good intelligence capabilities and high-quality (if obviously rather small) special forces — but this is nowhere near enough to offset our lack of ability to seriously deploy economic might or hard power to our advantage.

As is widely known in our circles, Britain has not been able to independently project power since Suez, with the sole exception of the Falklands. This greatly contrasts even with our closest neighbour: as recently as 2022, the French retained an active military presence throughout nearly the entirety of the Sahel. The French have also demonstrated a consistent ability to act both independently, and even against the wishes of the US — most notably when the US- and UN-recognised Libyan Government of National Accord accused France of supporting its rival, Khalifa Haftar. Evidently, this is an approach to foreign affairs that many on the Right sorely wish was undertaken in this country, though France’s own recent setbacks illustrate such an approach is of limited viability for any one European state acting alone.

The same cannot be said for the EU. A unified European foreign policy would necessarily bring far greater economic, military, and political force to bear in pursuit of our interests beyond the purview of America. Especially pressing is the shared European malaise surrounding energy and our wider resource security. A disciplined and ruthless European policy in vital resource-rich areas like the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa could prove critical to unlocking Europe’s and therefore Britain’s true economic potential. Equally, as a recent contribution to Pimlico Journal has persuasively argued, a European bloc could well foster a mutually beneficial rapprochement with Russia predicated on economic and mutual security interests. Such a unified European foreign policy obviously remains a distant prospect, but it must be remembered that politics can develop quickly and so one cannot rule out the swift centralisation of power in the EU. It must also be emphasised that the present state of the EU is in no way desirable or worth of emulation. Still, we maintain that a European civilisation-state offers the best path to the revitalisation of Europe, and therefore of Britain.

While to some such speculation will appear indulgent, we believe that the most important issue facing both Britain and Europe is the question of how to reclaim our sovereignty through the slow retreat of America’s global power. At present, Britain has become consciously subservient to the US. The creation of a united European foreign policy could mark an incomparable opportunity for Britain, as part of the wider European project, to take up a new position in world affairs. On the other hand, by isolating ourselves from Europe it is highly likely that we will exacerbate our present situation, a fate none will find remotely appealing. Of course, beyond the unthinking — basically idiotic — move towards ‘CANZUK’ and ‘AUKUS’, the prevailing view is that Britain ought to strike a middle path between America and Europe so as to maximise economic opportunities and influence. Whatever the chances of success, we think that (at best) this strategy would create a well-governed and economically prosperous nation. In such an eventuality, however, Britain would ultimately become little more than a Switzerland or Norway: perfectly pleasant, highly prosperous, and fundamentally unobjectionable societies which are utterly bereft of any historical significance. At its worst, this strategy could lead Britain to descend yet further into American vassalage, a fate Europe would likely share with us if the project of unification fails to deliver.

At a minimum, therefore, advocates of Brexit must accept that even if Brexit proves an economic and political success it will almost inevitably mean that Britain becomes irrelevant in world-historic terms. This is a fate we cannot accept. We wish to see Britain truly revitalised where this means we wish to see Britain recover its excellent in every domain of human activity from every science to every art so that we could be a world-historic culture once more. This means that we must not merely seek to rejoin the European project but to lead it so as to create this new and great Europe in our own image. Perhaps some will say that we are overly optimistic; that we will necessarily be drowned out by the continental mind. To this, we say this could well be the case, but so long as Europe forges a new identity and a new history, it would be better to join with them than to languish alone in the Atlantic, being little more than Ireland.

Regrettably, it is unlikely these arguments will have persuaded many of you. Alas, the fundamental desire for Brexit is based less in the practical questions facing Britain than in the ultimate vision one has for this nation. Accordingly, it will be to this subject that we turn in the final article in this series. Our own view is that Britain can only secure a new world-historic destiny as part of a broader project the rejuvenates European civilisation once more.

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This article was written by John Andrew Peckerwood, a Pimlico Journal contributor. Have a pitch? Send it to submissions@pimlicojournal.co.uk.

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