If demographics is indeed destiny, we do not need fifty-one percent of the population sitting at home making stew. But this – represented by the ‘trad wife’ – is apparently what many modern men and women want.
The ‘trad wife’ archetype finds its best representation in the modern imagination through the blonde and sundress-wearing female ‘Wojak’, who is typically (though not always) presented as the purse-lipped partner of ‘Yes Chad’ (a.k.a. the ‘Nordic Gamer’). It is common to set them against the backdrop of a homestead, with the woman holding tiny ‘Yes Chad’ babies; this husband-and-wife duo are taciturn yet self-confident, despite receiving heaps of abuse from an assortment of obnoxious city-dwelling ‘leftists’ and ‘feminists’ (who are also grotesquely ugly).
The idea here is that working the land is life affirming, unlike ‘email jobs’ in the cities; we are told to listen to this niggling inner voice that we all supposedly possess, the one that is beckoning us towards a more ‘noble’ and ‘primitive’ form of existence. The message is clear: we must live far away from the ‘life-denying’ cities, and the Woke that have occupied them. There is this idea that the fruits of consumerism – cat cafés that offer five different kinds of milk with your coffee – has corrupted the vitalism of mankind; that men becoming women, and women becoming (or at least acting like) men, has led to plummeting fertility rates.
Most fans (or not-fans) of the aforementioned ‘Wojak’ meme will, however, notice that while the blonde woman is unambiguously representing only one conceivable variant of a right-wing female – namely, the ‘trad wife’ – her partner, the ‘Yes Chad’, can be any sort of right-wing man. That is to say, the ‘Yes Chad’ might be a devoutly religious homesteader with fifteen children; but he could equally be obsessing over Nietzsche, Paganism, and the Battle of Stalingrad – similar to his ‘Chudjak’ cousin, but now better looking, and with a wife, a job, and an economics degree. This is a reflection on how the ‘trad wife’ has come to be seen as an appropriate counterpart and life partner to all right-wing men who aren’t ‘incels’.
This spares me from having to address the issue of the homesteading ‘trad husband’, as the ‘trad wife’ can, in fact, be detached from him. I have no interest in criticising this specific pairing as:
Few of the readers here at the Pimlico Journal identify with the homesteading, ‘off the grid’ husband.
Although obnoxious, the homesteading husband-and-wife duo are boring to criticise, as they are actually fairly consistent in their (idiotic) beliefs.
Homesteading (and adjacent phenomena) is more of an American right-wing subculture (how can one even ‘homestead’ in England?), and this journal is about the London Scene.
Low hanging fruit – they’re just too easy to mock, waiting as they are for ‘the collapse’, looking to overthrow the regime, but not by challenging it directly, but rather by listening to ‘Rich Men North of Richmond’ thousands of times and the geometric expansion of plumbers.
Considering how best to integrate young women into the right-wing scene without compromising the scene’s ideological integrity has, understandably, never been a top priority for most. Time has instead been expended on more pressing concerns. But this is how the personage of the ‘trad wife’ has managed to slither in and gain tacit but extremely widespread acceptance among our group, creating the illusion of limited choice: ‘it is either her, some libtard, or some whale’, the young heterosexual right-wing man has no doubt oft pondered to himself.
Little do people realise to what extent their acceptance of the ‘trad wife’ as appealing makes their vision of the future inconsistent, and full of contradictions: reconciling a love of Nietzsche, ‘vitalism’, ‘the Männerbund’, Bronze Age Pervert, Ancient Greece and Rome, et cetera in the ‘public sphere’, with the stifling, ‘safteyist’, domesticating lull of the mammy-like longhouser ‘trad wife’ in the ‘private sphere’ is like squaring the circle. But instead of the abandonment of the ‘trad wife’ archetype, she is now here to stay, as this circle has increasingly been squared by a combination of concerns over fertility rates, and a more general distrust in any woman’s ability to surmount her real or alleged biological barrier and attain masculine real-virtue.
Women not wanting to entirely dedicate their lives to motherhood is thus interpreted as ‘life-denying’. This can only be described as the most literalist and D-minus grade interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche, Bronze Age Pervert, or any other given right-wing thinker, both contemporary and historical. Here in ‘tradworld’, the mentality of the fertility cult in women is equated to ‘being based’ for a woman. Advocates of this model of life – which, for the record, come from both genders – are so obsessed with maximising fertility that these advocates have given up their early- to mid-2000s stance on the inferiority of girly media and the insipidness of female homosocial environments in order to dishonestly convince women that leaning into their most base, gendered, and third-world instincts will make them ‘life-affirming’ by mere association.
The bargaining chip of the ‘trad wife’, her contribution to the anti-Woke revolution, is her willingness to be a stay-at-home mother, and make boys who may turn out to be ‘based’ (hence the tiny ‘Yes Chads’ that appear in many memes alongside the ‘trad wife’). The obsession with fertility rates, and in turn ‘tradwifery’, has led to a society which resonates deeply with that refrain from ‘Honor to Us All’ from Mulan (1998):
We must all serve our emperor [our pro-growth government]
Who guards us from the Huns [the Woke]
A man by bearing arms
A girl by bearing sons
The woman, under the auspices of the ‘trad wife’ persona, is invited to operate under a different set of norms to her male counterparts: the feminine yin to the masculine yang. She cannot embody Western ideas of the aristocratic life, as that would tear her from her home and into the workforce, or – worse still – into the public forum of politics. Where the ideal ‘trad’ woman sees ‘nurture’ and ‘emotion’, her husband is supposed to see ‘competition’, ‘advancement’, and ‘calculation’. Where the ‘trad’ woman sees the stranger as someone to be viewed with suspicion, because of the potential danger he may pose to her children, her husband should see a fellow Briton who is to be trusted as part of a brotherhood of his fellow citizens of the Republic (‘we’re not tribal here in the West, we are high-trust’).
These two attitudes are contradictory, and gendering them such that family is female-coded, whereas the individual is male-coded, is a lazy and ineffectual way of reconciling a blatant contradiction in terms. C.S. Lewis understood this when he argued in Mere Christianity that women don’t make good rulers, because national leaders need to be patriots and women are instead ‘too patriotic for their family’. And knowing him, he almost definitely meant it as compliment. If the same thing were said about a man, it would conjure up all sorts of images of Oriental clannishness and developing-world patriarchs embroiled in petty civil wars over familial disputes. Counselling that first-world women should behave like ‘momma bears’ thins the line between the Western suburban mother and the Bhutanese warlord.
To what extent women are the true purveyors of third-world norms and values within their own societies – and how many of these norms and values are actually distinctly feminine – remains a question for the ages. In short, the political right needs to decide whether it is individuals or families who form the building blocks of society. It cannot be both. The same is true of the virtues — feminine virtues cannot be a separate type of virtue from masculine ones, and still be virtues; the ‘trad’ woman cannot be virtuous in the same way that her husband is, and vice versa. A 2000s millennial ‘girlboss’ is Bad, because she is ‘trying to be a man’ and doesn’t have children; and a feminine, wispish man is Bad, because he subscribes to ‘feminine’ ideas of community and co-operation, the likes which are not conducive to the pro-growth mentality that raises enormous cities from nought – yin and yang. The man’s qualities are supposed to complement those of his ‘tradwife’ by being different, just like the day and night, or cold and hot, or whatever other aspect of nature one might find explored in trite Ancient Chinese poetry.
Moreover, upon closer inspection, this form of understanding the partnership between femininity and masculinity not only appears Oriental and mystical, but also untenable and unsustainable. If modernity and the temptation to become manly, wealthy, and urbanite will inevitably contaminate the woman who lives in the city, then how will she be able to live in the premises of the ‘based’ man who loves cityscapes and who feels a natural urge to be at the centre of things? I know that there is a certain admiration for the Athenian habit of confining the woman to the home, which can in theory be implemented here, but what will that home look like? Is it to be believed that a ‘cottagecore’ home on the thirty-second floor of a skyscraper overlooking a Shinkanzen track is anything but a visual representation of the dissonance of a society where there are two opposing paradigms of morality, two opposing worldviews?
Just as the masculine world outside the home may compromise a woman’s femininity, the feminine world inside the home must logically also have a feminising effect on a man. Is this worth risking? This also raises the question of whether man and woman should live apart – the man in the big city, the woman in the suburbs or the countryside. But if they were to have a son, how would he be raised? Even the fundamental biological fact of his being a man is surely not enough to entirely save him from being influenced by the primitive attitudes that are inevitably bred in the private sphere if he were to be raised exclusively among women for his whole life. Remember that the sons of mediaeval noblemen were mainly ‘raised’ by their fathers; during the day, they would see little of their mother. Most genuinely ‘trad’ European societies did not think it was the woman’s job to raise sons. It was the great Oscar Wilde who once said: ‘All women become like their mothers. That is their tragedy. No man does, and that is his.’ (Obviously, only a gay man is fully capable of coming to this understanding, though that doesn’t diminish its truth.) Are there to be boarding schools where these boys could be shipped off to in order to avoid cross-contamination with the feminising influence of their mothers and sisters? And how will we fund this?
Centuries of Indo-European patriarchy and its monopoly on morality, followed by a fiercely unitarian Christianity which posited that in Christ, both man and woman can find a singular role model, despite Christ himself being a man — centuries that culminated in Christine de Pizan’s City of the Ladies (1405), which negotiated the acknowledgment of women’s honour by women’s incorporation into the singular paradigm of male virtues — all of this has seemingly collapsed into nothing. And all it took was a recession and the recent decline of fertility rates for Western civilisation to fall into a dualist mode of thinking about the moral and occupational division of labour between genders. Could these be the real ‘Cartesian dualists’ in our midst?
Perhaps This Trans Business (*nods*) has just been one massive distraction from the real enemy, the real source of dangerously mystical thinking in the West: the Oriental yin-yang idea of the relation between gender and the Good, viz., the idea that there can be two, separate forms of the Good, represented by ‘feminine’ (pseudo-)virtues and ‘masculine’ (real-)virtues. In reality, the former are either no more than a paler, more auxiliary, and basically inferior form of the latter, or are not in fact ‘virtues’ at all.
For instance, it is obvious that the feminine pseudo-virtue of ‘Nurture’ is in fact merely a watered down and less intense form of the masculine real-virtue of ‘Love’ — or whatever we might call what was felt by King Hrothgar towards his people as he shed tears of gratitude and relief for Beowulf, who had rescued them from the monster. In this instance, feminine pseudo-virtues are just another version of the Good — just less profound, and less impressive. This is not only highly Oriental and contrary to both Christian and pre-Christian modes of European thought, but it helps legitimise a form of slave morality. After all, few could deny that feminine pseudo-virtues are generally defined by having come out as partial or total rejections of male real-virtues, amounting in a ressentiment and weak-man way of seeing the world as something that needs to be equalised, pacified, and defanged; a kindergarten writ large.
Is there even any practical use for these feminine pseudo-virtues, even in the domestic sphere? In many ways, importing a masculine mentality into the home will only lead to an improvement in conditions. Imagine how much better routine, home-cooked food would be if the average housewife would be subject to the same market forces, principles of accountability, and stressors that her husband faces every day at work. Ever wonder why soulless Bella Italia conveyor-belt pasta is still better than some of the home-cooked slop that you were sometimes served when you visited your friend’s house as a child and stayed over for dinner? Well, here’s your answer.
As for an example of a ‘feminine’ pseudo-virtue that is in fact outright antithetical to a ‘masculine’ real-virtue, the aforementioned ‘Familialism’ is openly unjust, and in clear opposition to impartiality: an inherent aspect of the masculine real-virtue of ‘Justice’, which is sacrificed to nothing more than the need to glorify primitive forms of motherly emotion which are overbearing to anyone that isn’t the parent’s child or husband (although they are often also the victims). In reality, this produces no private benefit, let alone public, given that most of these mothers’ sons will end up as replicas of Joffrey Baratheon from Game of Thrones.
Shoddy historical knowledge and decades of pro-natalist propaganda in both Protestant and Catholic churches has made ‘trads’ elevate the estate of motherhood into something beyond a mere human social fact, and into a thing of mysticism. Under this semi-mystical and (as we will see) subversive system of thought, motherhood became something that, by virtue of their ‘womb energy’ and shared gender with Christ’s mother, only they can understand – thus endowing them with some separate jurisdiction within the home, the ‘private sphere’. It is a shame that such rich imagination is expended on mundane and self-serving ends: living as a ‘stay-at-home daughter’.
The origins of this family dynamic, some readers might be shocked to know, is far older than TikTok. It dates back to the patria potestas of the Romans, where all women except the Vestal Virgins were eternal daughters in the eyes of the law; marriage was merely the transfer of a daughter from her biological father to her ‘adoptive’ one (i.e., her husband). This was a practice that even the great Roman law enthusiast, Sir Henry Maine (1822-1888), thought was ‘difficult to understand as an institution of civilised life’.
Before any readers here at Pimlico muse about the appeal of such a system, and wonder at its efficacy at keeping women in check, I would remind you that the domestic despotism of the patria potestas came with the corollary that men with living fathers are also under a perpetual tutelage of their own. The creation of a private sphere, jus privatum, that was entirely separate from the public sphere, jus publicum — a sphere where ‘family life’, ‘emotion’, and ‘womanhood’ could be dumped, perhaps in order to prevent the contamination of the public sphere by ‘women’s tears’ — will quite naturally generate a forcefield of domestic tyranny that will inevitably swallow us whole and all. Even giving legal primacy to the public sphere does not appear to have been enough in pre-Justinian times, as the Roman jurisprudential maxim that the patria potestas did not extend to the jus publicum did not stop high-ranking civil servants from getting quite literally ‘longhoused’ by their fathers (their patria potestas) the second that they were not exercising their public role, since they had limited power (dominium) over their own property, as it fell under ‘private law’.
Now, replace the Roman patrician with the new head of the private sphere in a man’s life – the woman that the male admirers of the ‘trad wife’, implicit supporters of the matria potestas, have permitted her to carve out for herself. This will conjure up a familiar image: the CEO on a £750k/pa salary, who only one hour ago was directing his company during a hostile takeover, now being screamed at by his wife for throwing his shirt on the floor. Or what about the somewhat more humble businessman who works eighty hours a week, and has to live in a pastel-tinted hell with flowery furniture funded by his salary, because not having enough time to spend at home somehow deprives him of the right to control his property – that is to say, what his money is spent on.
More extreme still is a society like contemporary South Korea, in which a woman’s role of ‘taking charge of the finances’ translates to personal liberty for the wife to spend the money on whatever she wishes, while the husband needs to place a request if he wants any of it for personal or business expenses — overtly mimicking a parent-child dynamic to an extreme. We in the modern West have already started heading that way ourselves.
Maine has called the endurance of the patria potestas throughout the centuries as one of ‘the strangest problems in legal history’. I must confess that I do not share in his confusion. Both Roman father and son, by virtue of being men, simultaneously existed in both the public and the private sphere, as they could participate in political life wherever they were commanded to act in the interest of the communitas. This being a part of their everyday life, it is highly unlikely that they left the public spirit at the door upon re-embodying their ‘private’ roles as father and son within and without the family home. The Romans trusted that most fathers would not be unreasonable in exercising their patria potestas such that it would lead to societal collapse, and they were right. Now, swap the Roman father with a disenfranchised woman who is taught by modern right-wing Gender War ideology that she has no business acting in anyone’s interest except that of her own, her child’s, and family’s, and can only cognitively deal in subjectivities, and see how unreasonable she can become in exercising her matria potestas, perhaps even to the collapse of Western civilisation.
It is a good thing, then, that the legal enfranchisement of women occurred when it did in the West – just as the gaps between the private and public spheres were closing, and society shifted from one of status to one of contract.
If we fast forward to the decentralised paradise of fifteenth-century England, the ‘private’ noble home was the caput of the earl where he would conduct the ‘public’ business of providing legal maintenance for retainers and witnessing ordinances. His wife, the countess, would (like the Oriental women of today) also be managing the finances; except, as surviving account books show, this entailed her assiduously working out how to reduce costs involved in running her and husband’s households so that more money could be made available to expend on his public aims. Even the splendour of her very garments served an aim beyond sexually enticing her husband or making other women jealous — demonstrating that her house is a wealthy one, and one where lower gentry, merchants, and yeoman can appeal to should they need a mediator and/or patron. An examination of the ‘personal’ expenses of a parsimonious Cecily Neville or Elizabeth Woodville would soon reveal a litany of gifts to monastic institutions, alms, and tactful gifts of money to all sorts of people they played ‘good lady’ to, very closely mirroring the ‘good lordship/kingship’ of their husbands.
There was no strict separation of public and private sphere any more than there was one between systems of morality. Naturally, the home was more ‘private’ than somewhere like Parliament (where women weren’t allowed); this distinction somewhat existed, but that didn’t change the fact that most men, regardless of estate, conducted their business mostly within their own home, and during peacetime spent the vast majority of their time within a space they shared with their wife.
There were no cubicles in mansion house for men flee to, nor a PTA waiting room in some crèche for women to congregate and gossip over coffee after they drop their kids off at school. Male homosocial environments during the mediaeval ages — e.g., hunting, war, and sport — remained well and unthreatened in a world where people did not resort to yin-yang ideas of a moral division of labour between genders. Neither man nor woman had to be chucked into this strictly delineated ‘private sphere’ — men’s money was spent for them, even if not always by them, and men were the ones who had a handle on sexual selection.
So what happened? Well, western societies progressed past the patria potestas of the Roman age; others not so much.
This is one of the few instances where a social phenomenon occurs quite independently to the actual wealth of a nation. The early departure from an authoritarian kinship structure and strict private-public separation in wealthy families, as a phenomenon, is almost entirely exclusive to the West — that is to say, Europe and its overseas outposts. So much so that the differences in attitudes between poorer Eastern Europeans — after decades of communism, and many centuries of much closer proximity to hostile Oriental powers, such as the Ottoman Empire and the Mongol Hordes — and wealthier Western Europeans are basically non-existent; by contrast, between Western Europe and the similarly wealthy and ‘developed’ economies of East Asia — e.g., Korea, Japan, Taiwan — there is a world of difference.
Don’t believe me? Just ask the ‘clear-pilled’ Chinese girls of #BRG (‘based retard gang’) who believe that being a ‘Schopenhauerian Hyperborean’ means dressing like a six-year-old and making your boyfriend/husband treat you ‘like a princess’ and call you ‘milady’. Your task as a hyperborean woman? Shut yourself inside to avoid tanning. After five years, with any luck, you will obtain the same complexion that an eighteenth-century Irish peasant was born with for free, and you will thus gain a place in the ‘spiritual aristocracy’. Only a non-Western community with chronic social elitism (in the worst possible way) could ever so gravely misappropriate what is objectively an individualist and anti-domesticity philosophy in order to endorse such a materialist, social-climbing, and unashamedly parasitic farce of a lifestyle.
And what about their boys? Well, their boys just let them do it. This is because their boys believe that because their women say they are so special, they actually are — so their boys believe that their women really do have the power of choice, and that they choose them as opposed to vice versa, so these women thus become in charge of sexual selection — which, being the great power that it is, pacifies their women into not looking outside the home for participation in broader society. Needless to say, East Asian upper-middle and upper class families share the end-product of this sort of gender ontology with their Arabian and Indian counterparts. Their women also find being a performative housewife a status symbol, just as they find snow-white skin to be prerequisite to attraction. (Coincidentally (or not), all these women are also especially drawn to the label of ‘princess’.)
A certain poorly-informed X.com user once said that a ‘society that looks to the stars’ — giving the specific example of Sparta — necessarily keeps their women politically disenfranchised, but gives them the leading hand in sexual selection. Needless to say, in reality, it was quite the opposite in Sparta: Spartan women had an unusual amount of political power by the standards of the Ancient World, but had no special power over sexual selection. More laughable still is the idea that women are better ‘eugenicists’ than men. Societies where mothers have had a hand in choosing their son’s spouse have not produced the best people, needless to say, either in looks or in character. In many ways, Western society was saved by the fact that for many centuries, the primary sexual selector was far closer to the bratty corporate manchild of the average ’90s romcom than the typical mother.
Hitherto, we in Europe have (thankfully) managed to escape this form of social organisation. But if the ‘incels’ are to be believed, this golden age has now come to an end. Yet if the Romans did not manage to fully separate personal property from the sphere of private law, what makes anyone think that we can separate sexual selection and match-making from the matria potestas? After all, even less so than property is love and marriage a matter of the public sphere. Right-wing men find it somehow pathetic and feminine to waste too much time pondering over, trying to find, and eventually wooing a woman who is ‘at one’s level’ in terms of intelligence and worldview. Must we really live in a world with state-mandated girlfriends to rectify the cultural and genetic wrongs of our era? Or can’t we just all agree to collectively put to dust the myth of female hypergamy and ‘feminine virtues’, which have hitherto served as nothing but excuses for women to live as stay-at-home daughters to their long-suffering, out-of-their-league boyfriends and husbands?
Fragility, meekness, and softness are not ‘masculine virtues’, but nor are they ‘feminine virtues’. Historically they were not considered to be virtues at all in the Western world, either for men or for women. There is nothing wrong with ‘masculine virtues’ — that is to say, real-virtues — or a masculine worldview — so why do we need Oriental anti-feminism to cancel out and neutralise something that is already perfect, and accessible to both genders? It is fine for a woman to be disagreeable as long as it is for the right things: bad politics are more of an issue than the gender of the person expressing them.
For lack of space, we have mostly ignored the claims of ‘evopsych’ (and differential psychology), which will be addressed at length in a future article. But for now, let us just say that the field is guilty of ceaselessly and invalidly transforming an ‘is’ into an ‘ought’. But even if the ‘evopsych’ crowd are correct that masculine real-virtues are more attainable for men than they are for women, this does not necessitate the creation of multiple forms of the Good, any more than racial disparities in academic achievement justify the creation of multiple types of ‘smarts’. And even if most women fall well short of the average man in their virtue, society would still be improved by Western women rediscovering a correct understanding of the singular Good and maximising whatever potential they have, regardless of how low it may be.
And finally, stop worrying quite so much about fertility and marriage rates. Believing that women do not need men is exactly what they want you to believe. They do need men. Don’t let their lower libido fool you into thinking that the approval of men isn’t vital to their self-image and identity, in a manner not even closely resembling the gender reverse.
Stop our women from slipping into Oriental despotism — something that is antithetical to the interests of men, women, and the nation as a whole. Stop worrying that a large chunk of them will simply choose to become spinsters in protest of men not fulfilling every material whim that they demand ‘to feel protected’. They are not that noble, and this isn’t that deep to them. They will eventually adapt to the other gender’s demands, just as the modern man seems to have done so for them.
In terms of virtues, I would think it is true to say that men and women should aspire to the same virtues, and I would suggest that is because virtues are virtuous regardless of gender. It is not because women should aspire to masculine virtues, but because human virtues are universal. That said, I think that men and women, having different biology and (therefore often) different life trajectories, may express virtues differently. The expression of strength in a mother may look different to strength in a father.
One of the most insightful articles I've read. As I said to you on 'X', women are always going to bother us men no matter where they are placed. I'm not sure I want a nagging housewife as my lifelong partner. I would prefer a woman who has similar values to myself.